Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
Syria was doing everything possible to sabotage the Israel-Palestinian peace process, backing
Hamas and supporting radical PLO forces in Lebanon, among other efforts. Despite sporadic
negotiations in 1995 and 1996, no real progress was made in Syrian-Israeli talks. The details of
a negotiated settlement were not the problem; rather, peace with Israel was not in the Syrian
regime's fundamental interest.
RABIN'S ASSASSINATION AND ITS AFTERMATH
On November 4, 1995, Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres attended a peace rally
at Tel Aviv's City Hall in the Square of the Kings of Israel. As the two leaders left the stage, a
young religious nationalist named Yigal Amir fatally shot Rabin, believing the assassination
would sabotage the peace process and prevent Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. The act
traumatized the nation in a way perhaps unequaled in its history. The passionate disputes over
policy and the extreme right-wing's demonization of Rabin were both blamed. Thereafter, the
national debate over the peace process deescalated amid awareness that things had gone too
far. Peres, who immediately became acting prime minister, renewed Rabin's coalition eighteen
days later. Believing that the country's mood had swung to support the peace process whole-
heartedly, in part because of revulsion over the assassination, Peres called new elections for
May 1996.
At this point, a new element entered the picture and turned public opinion in the opposite
direction. In late February and early March 1996, following the killing of a bomb maker who
had been responsible for many previous attacks, Hamas launched a wave of suicide bombings
in Jerusalem, Ashkelon, and Tel Aviv, killing more than fi fty Israelis and causing a suspension
of the peace process. Israel once again closed its borders with the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, this time for an indefi nite period, and demanded that the PA rein in Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad.
While Rabin's assassination had reinforced support in Israel for the peace process, now
seen as the fallen leader's legacy, the Palestinian attacks made Israelis question the effective-
ness and direction of events. After all, if creating the PA and making concessions had led only
to an increase in terrorism —when it was supposed to decrease it —how effective was this
strategy? In response to doubts, the government tried to rally support with the argument that
letting the terrorists succeed in stopping the peace process altogether would be giving them a
victory.
The February 1996 elections were a referendum on the peace process as well as the fi rst
direct elections for prime minister. Peres was expected to win, but escalating Palestinian ter-
rorism and the candidate's low personal popularity, among other factors, gave the victory to
Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu, albeit in a close vote. Netanyahu formed a broad coalition
government with a half-dozen centrist, religious, and right-wing parties.
While Netanyahu had been critical of the Oslo process, as prime minister he accepted the
framework, merely asserting that he would negotiate more effectively. A key element in his
approach was the concept of “reciprocity,” meaning that the PA would have to meet its com-
mitments more fully and clearly to receive more Israeli concessions. Yet Israel's conduct of the
process changed in no major way, which ultimately led right-wing parties to bring Netanyahu's
government down.
