Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
any new settlements or expand the existing ones territorially, but it retained the right to con-
struct new buildings in existing settlements.
During the course of reaching terms for a full peace treaty, the two sides were to negotiate
all issues, including the future of the territories, Jewish settlements, Jerusalem, and Palestinian
refugees. An international consortium of donors would provide massive aid to fund the PA's
budget.
Rabin and Arafat met in Cairo on October 6, 1993, to agree to the details of implementing
the Oslo Accords, including the ground rules for the PA's operation and the establishment of
bilateral committees to resolve issues and prepare for the comprehensive negotiations. At the
last moment, after agreement was reached and all the leaders were on stage to sign the agree-
ments, Arafat demanded more concessions. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the host,
rebuked Arafat, and the Palestinian leader fi nally agreed, but added a note making his accep-
tance of the deal conditional on getting more from Israel.
Another crisis occurred when an extremist Jewish settler massacred twenty-nine Muslim
worshippers at a Hebron mosque that also marked a Jewish holy site. Nevertheless, on May 4,
1994, Israel and the PLO signed an agreement in Cairo outlining the parameters of Palestinian
self-rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. According to the agreement, the IDF would withdraw
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the Palestinians would deploy 9,000 police offi cers there, and
the PA would begin operations. On July 1, 1994, Arafat returned to Gaza City to inaugurate
his rule.
From the start, there were worrisome signs. For example, Rabin quickly learned that when
Arafat and his entourage entered Gaza, he sneaked in four terrorists who had killed Israelis,
the only specifi c individuals barred by Israel from coming with him. Rabin insisted that they
leave, but soon thereafter they returned, heralding the frustrations to come. Rabin and Peres
wanted to make the process work if possible and did not want to be blamed for slowing the
peace process down. Consequently, they generally remained silent about such complaints.
Although the PLO had signed the Oslo Accords, Arafat had barely gained the majority on
its Executive Committee that he needed to support his action. Several leaders resigned; others
continued to oppose any negotiations or compromise with Israel. The two Palestinian Islamist
groups —Hamas and the smaller Islamic Jihad — took an even harder line, using terrorism to
overturn the peace process and build Palestinian support for their own positions.
The PA had to decide how to handle the problem. According to the Oslo Accords, the PA's
job was to block attacks on Israel; arrest, prosecute, and imprison the perpetrators of attacks;
create the infrastructure for a stable state that could raise living standards; and prepare the
Palestinian people to live in peace alongside Israel. Israel monitored progress in these areas.
In dealing with the Islamists, the more radical PLO member groups, and the more radical
forces in Fatah, Arafat had several choices. One was to discipline its own ranks, fulfi ll its com-
mitments to stop terrorism, and either force Hamas to obey its dictates or repress the group.
The PA could aim to administer the territory effectively and change its orientation from that
of a revolutionary group using violence to attain its goals to that of a government with a state
to build.
