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tion to destroy Israel. Israel's position was that it would negotiate with the PLO only if and
when that organization changed its stance, to be signaled by its acceptance of UN Resolu-
tion 242 — representing recognition of Israel's right to exist as a state — and abandonment of
terrorism.
Since negotiation with the PLO was ruled out, Israel tried to proceed in two ways. It sought
to give local Palestinians autonomy, as promised in the Egypt-Israel agreement, but this ap-
proach ultimately failed because the PLO intimidated West Bank mayors who thought of ac-
cepting it — two of them were assassinated. The alternative was the “Jordanian option,” an
attempt to negotiate with Jordan's government. Returning Jordan's pre-1967 control over the
West Bank would, Israel hoped, set the stage for a “Palestinian solution.”
In retrospect, it is clear that six Arab-Israeli wars on the state level— in 1948, 1956, 1967,
1968 -1970, 1973, and 1982 —had sated the appetite of Arab countries for fi ghting losing wars
against Israel. For the next couple of decades, the battles would be fought by non-state actors
that were clients of some Arab states and increasingly of Iran. Such groups as the PLO, Hamas,
and Hizballah could attack and kill Israeli civilians and disrupt life in the captured territories,
but they could not signifi cantly harm, much less defeat, Israel itself. So the country continued
to develop internally and, despite appearances at times, enjoyed a far higher degree of security
than before.
The Jordanian government was stable and had shown its ability to control the Palestin-
ian forces within Jordan's borders. Moreover, Jordan benefi ted from Israel's existence, which
countered the aggressiveness of its more powerful Arab neighbors and ensured Jordan's sov-
ereignty. Both Jordan and Israel had fought the PLO, and from Amman's standpoint, a West
Bank under PLO control would be a threat rather than a cause for celebration.
Shimon Peres, prime minister from 1984 to 1986 and foreign minister for the next two years,
was the main advocate of a Jordanian solution. The key initiative during this period was the
attempt of King Hussein of Jordan to forge Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation with himself as
the senior partner. King Hussein's main effort came in a February 1985 proposal to establish a
Jordan-Palestinian delegation to negotiate with Israel, an initiative that PLO leader Arafat told
him the PLO accepted. But Arafat reneged on that commitment, and after a year of fruitless
attempts, the king announced that he was cutting off political contacts with the PLO. Hus-
sein nevertheless made a second attempt in secret exchanges with Foreign Minister Peres in
1987. Again, no agreement was reached. Unlike Sadat's Egypt, Jordan could not hope to defy
virtually all of the Arab states plus the PLO. In early 1988 the king fi nally and forever dropped
Jordan's claim to the West Bank.
The PLO, now ensconced in far-off Tunis, continued its terrorist campaign against Israel
during the 1980s although, given the lack of a secure and safe haven on Israel's borders, it
staged many of its attacks in other countries. In September 1985, for example, terrorists from
Force 17, Arafat's elite bodyguard group, murdered three Israeli civilians who had sailed to
Cyprus. In response to this and other attacks, Israel bombed the PLO headquarters in Tunis.
Shortly thereafter, in October, a PLO member group carried out a long-planned operation to
hijack the
Achille Lauro,
an Italian cruise ship, in the eastern Mediterranean, in the course of
which they killed an American Jewish passenger. Arafat negotiated the surrender of the terror-
