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economy. Israel annexed the Golan Heights in December 1981, although this move was not
recognized internationally. Other developments in the north would set off the government's
greatest crisis.
After being expelled from Jordan in 1970, the PLO had moved its base of operations to
Lebanon, where it had created a virtual state within a state. It used south Lebanon for launch-
ing cross-border attacks against Israel that often resulted in civilian deaths. By 1981, the PLO
was building up forces in the south and creating a regular army — or what nearly amounted
to one. After major clashes in the region, the PLO and Israel negotiated a ceasefi re indirectly.
Fatah generally observed it but allowed or encouraged smaller PLO groups to continue attacks.
Israel remained concerned about the buildup there as preparation for a future war.
The situation worsened in June 1982, when an attack by Palestinian terrorists on Israel's
ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, paralyzed him for life. Israel forged a
secret alliance with Maronite Christian militias, which had been fi ghting the PLO and its allies
in a Lebanese civil war, and formulated a plan; its chief author was the Israeli defense minister,
Ariel Sharon. The plan was for Israel to defeat the PLO and its Syrian partners, thus allowing
the Christians to win the civil war, install a government, and make peace with Israel.
The Israeli offensive that began in June 1982 was called Operation Peace for Galilee. Israeli
forces advanced quickly, defeating PLO and Syrian troops, and tens of thousands of Lebanese
civilians fl ed northward. Israeli forces soon reached Beirut but stopped there, since an attempt
to capture the whole city would have caused high casualties for all concerned. U.S. envoy Philip
Habib coordinated diplomatic efforts, and the sides reached an agreement under which Syrian
and Palestinian forces would leave Beirut by September 1, to be replaced by an international
peacekeeping force composed mostly of American, French, and Italian soldiers. In due course,
the Christian leader, Bashir Gemayel, became Lebanon's president. At this point, however, a
hitherto successful operation unraveled.
Determined to block Israeli hegemony over Lebanon and ensure its own continued infl u-
ence, Syria had Gemayel assassinated. To root out the remaining PLO and Fatah infrastructure
in refugee camps near Beirut, Israeli forces surrounded the Sabra and Shatila camps and al-
lowed Christian militiamen to enter them. The militiamen, seeking revenge for the assassina-
tion of their leader and for massacres of Christians perpetrated in the bloody civil war, killed
over a thousand civilians, mostly Palestinians, living in the camps.
This event set off an international outcry and much protest in Israel as well. The war had
already been criticized because, unlike its predecessors, it was a war of “choice” rather than
necessity, as some saw it. Begin set up a full judicial inquiry under Chief Justice Yitzhak Kahan
to investigate the massacre and Israel's role in it. The Kahan Report, published on February 8,
1983, put direct responsibility on the Lebanese militia but blamed several Israeli leaders for
failing to control or keep the militiamen out of the camps altogether. It censured Begin and
recommended that Sharon be removed from his post.
The plan also faltered in achieving its strategic goals. An Israel-Lebanon agreement ending
the war between the two countries was declared on May 17, 1983. But President Amin Gemayel,
who had succeeded his murdered brother, was too weak to enforce it over Syrian opposition.
In addition, although PLO leader Arafat and his army sailed away to a new headquarters in
