Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
So 1967 marked the beginning of the decades-long “peace process.” The central issue to
be resolved was embodied in the two divergent resolutions: the reconciliation of Western at-
tempts to negotiate peace and the Arab refusal to make it. The decision by the authors of the
resolution to speak of Israeli withdrawal from “territories” rather than “
the
territories” meant,
in Israel's interpretation, that a full withdrawal was not required. The U.S. and British ambas-
sadors to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg and Lord Caradon, who composed the text,
supported that view. Israel also held out for direct negotiations, which would force Arab inter-
locutors to extend some form of de facto recognition.
This outcome of the war set the framework for Israeli policy and debate during the fol-
lowing decades — a period of high self-confi dence but no illusions about the ease of making
peace and ending the confl ict. The Israeli consensus was that until full peace was achieved —
something that would take a very long time —Israel would retain the captured territories as a
guarantee of its security and as leverage to obtain a full diplomatic settlement that satisfi ed its
requirements. Those on the political right argued that waiting meant, in practice, permanent
retention of the territories, since the Arab side would never make peace and since Israel had its
own historical and religious claim to some of the land.
For many years after the war, the issue remained the subject of a passionate but abstract
debate; only Arab — especially Palestinian and Syrian — offers to make full peace in exchange
for captured territory could resolve the matter. In the meantime, the Labor Party and a na-
tional consensus favored establishing settlements in specifi c areas that Israel might seek to
retain — east Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, and areas close to the pre-1967
national borders. The political right favored additional settlement in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank generally.
Another effect of the 1967 defeat was severe damage to the prestige of the USSR in the Arab
world. To repair its position, the Soviet Union rebuilt the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces. In
1968, using powerful Soviet-supplied artillery on the Suez Canal's western bank, Nasser began
a war of attrition to reduce Israel's presence in the Sinai. Heavy casualties were infl icted on
Israeli troops, especially in July and October 1968, and at times Soviet pilots fl ew missions for
the Egyptian air force. Israel retaliated with air and artillery attacks, forcing Egypt to evacuate
nearby towns, the canal, and oil refi neries, at great cost to Egypt.
The instability inspired Western — and especially U.S.— peacemaking efforts. In June 1970,
Secretary of State William Rogers announced an initiative, after consultation with the Arab
side but not with Israel, that sought “to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talk-
ing.” National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger ridiculed the proposal as too one-sided to
achieve anything. Israel agreed only reluctantly to unilateral withdrawal from the east side of
the Suez Canal and soon complained that Egypt was violating the ceasefi re agreement by mov-
ing antiaircraft missile launch sites right next to the canal. The Rogers plan was soon aban-
doned, and U.S.-Israel relations emerged stronger than ever because of other events.
The key factor in improving relations was the rise of large-scale Palestinian terrorist activ-
ity, backed by several Arab regimes and secretly by the Soviet Union, targeting Israel and, in
some cases, moderate Arab governments aligned with the United States. The offensive was led
by Fatah, which during this period took over the PLO. One of its aims was to force Arab states
