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then demanded that the UN force patrolling the Sinai since the 1956 war be removed. The
United Nations immediately complied, making possible an Egyptian advance to Israel's bor-
der. Nasser also imposed a total blockade on Israeli shipping at the Straits of Tiran, regardless
of the U.S. promise in 1956 that it would ensure Israeli passage through the straits and also of
Israel's assertion that such a step would be a cause for war.
It is generally not realized how reluctant Israeli leaders were to attack in response to these
threats. Nasser and other Arab leaders were openly speaking about a fi nal showdown in which
Israel would be eliminated. Many outside observers thought that this was precisely what would
happen. For Israel, war meant risking a possible defeat leading to the country's destruction and
a massacre of its inhabitants. The decision to attack was so fraught with danger that even Gen-
eral Yitzhak Rabin, who favored an Israeli offensive, reportedly had a brief nervous breakdown
because of the weight of responsibility on him.
When Prime Minister Levi Eshkol spoke on the national radio about the crisis in May 1967,
his apparent indecision stirred up a great amount of concern among the Israeli public, other
political leaders, and the army. In response, the Labor Party and the main opposition parties
formed a national unity government. Moshe Dayan, a retired general, became defense minis-
ter, with Rabin as chief of staff of the armed forces.
In line with the doctrine developed since independence, Israel committed itself to attack
rather than face an assault on its own limited territory. The result was a preemptive surprise at-
tack against Egypt beginning early in the morning of June 5, 1967. Israel's enemies, despite their
prewar bluster, were caught poorly prepared. The Israeli air force wiped out Egypt's air force
on the ground, and the Israeli army advanced quickly into the Sinai and seized that peninsula
up to the Suez Canal's eastern bank.
The Israeli forces fi ghting against Syria benefi ted from having maps of the defense of the
Golan Heights, provided by a spy, Eli Cohen, who had paid with his life for obtaining them.
The army moved up the slopes and took all the high ground that long had been used to shell
Israeli towns below.
On the Jordanian front, however, Israel hesitated. Prime Minister Eshkol had promised
King Hussein not to attack if he kept his country out of the fi ghting. But the king faced too
much public pressure to stay neutral, and Nasser had falsely assured him that the Arabs were
gaining a huge victory. As a result, Jordan entered the war; but without help from its allies, it
suffered total defeat. Israel captured the entire West Bank and east Jerusalem. Of special sig-
nifi cance for Israelis was taking the holiest site for all for Jews, the Old City and the Western
Wall, the remaining retaining wall of the Temple. These are located in east Jerusalem, which
Jordan had governed since 1948 and where it had deliberately destroyed synagogues and Jewish
cemeteries.
Within six days, then, Israel had gone from what had seemed to be imminent annihilation
to victory — a victory so total and with such low casualties that Israelis saw the results as close
to miraculous.
Would the Six-Day War have any effect on the broader political situation? The answer came
from the November 1967 Arab summit conference in Khartoum, Sudan. The countries in
