Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
1. The Arab Gulf States — the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Qa-
tar, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates)— import six times more Western
goods than Israel does.
2. Israel has one vote in the United Nations; Arabic-speaking states have twenty-fi ve;
and Muslim-majority states, most of which are not friendly toward Israel, have fi fty.
In the 1950s and 1960s especially, there were countervailing forces, including the enthusiasm
for Israel in liberal and socialist circles abroad; the post-Holocaust reaction against antisemi-
tism; and respect for Israel's democratic system, economic advances, and military victories.
At that time, pro-Israel lobbies among Western Jewish communities were, however, of little
importance.
Given the participation by many Arab regimes in Third World movements and, during the
Cold War, the nonaligned movement, as well as the alliance of some Arab regimes with the
Soviet bloc, Israel's diplomatic task became even trickier. The tide turned, at least for a while,
because of two strategic factors. First, by acting as enemies of the West, radical Arab regimes
gave Western countries an extra incentive to support Israel. Second, Israel showed through its
stability, victory in the 1967 war, and disproportionate regional power that it was an asset in the
Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.
During the 1950s and up to 1967, Israel's principal ally was France, whose leaders were
bound to Israel by a common socialist leadership, wartime links in the anti-Fascist struggle,
and French opposition to the Arab nationalism that was subverting its control over its North
African colonies. When Charles de Gaulle became president of France in 1958 with a policy
of giving up Algeria, however, France's strategy slowly began to shift. The relationship col-
lapsed in 1967, when de Gaulle responded to Israel's preemptive attack by abandoning the al-
liance in favor of trying to align with the Arab world. As a result, Israel lost its main source of
weapons.
A second important Israeli relationship in Europe was with West Germany, based partly on
that country's repentance over the Nazis' actions against Jews. But West Germany did not have
the same degree of international infl uence as France or the ability to supply advanced weap-
ons. And since West Germany and its Communist counterpart, East Germany, were compet-
ing for international support, the West Germans feared that too close a link to Israel would
lead Arab states to align with their Soviet-backed foe. Thus, the strategic value of West Ger-
many's friendship was limited for Israel. Although Israel also had good relations generally with
Western European, South American, and smaller Asian states, none of these could provide
strategic backup, signifi cant aid, or advanced weapons.
The single most important diplomatic question for Israel was the stance it took on the main
issue of the era, the Cold War. Given Israel's democratic orientation and the fact that both
China and the Soviet Union backed its most militant Arab foes, neutrality was impossible, and
the United States was the obvious choice as a strategic partner. But believing that Israel would
not be a valuable ally and that a relationship would alienate all the Arab regimes, the United
States was reluctant to build an alliance during the 1950s and well into the 1960s. As key Arab
