Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS
As Israel was consolidating state and society, its Arab neighbors were undergoing a period
of tremendous instability. The most important development was a 1952 military coup over-
throwing the Egyptian monarchy and the takeover of Egypt's leadership two years later by
Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Egyptian president saw himself, and was widely seen, as leader of the
Arab world. A key element in that leadership was a readiness to battle Israel.
Egyptian offi cers in the Gaza Strip helped recruit and organize Palestinian guerrillas to
stage cross-border raids. Israel responded with reprisals. In the largest such attack, carried out
on February 28, 1955, the IDF unintentionally infl icted casualties on the Egyptian army as well,
producing increased tensions between the two countries.
Another component of Egyptian policy was to develop an alliance with the Soviet Union
as a superpower ally that could promote Cairo's regional ambitions. In August 1955, Egypt se-
cured a large arms deal with the Soviet bloc. Israel worried that if those weapons were delivered
to the Egyptian army, Cairo might attack Israel along with other Arab states. But Nasser made
other enemies. He alienated Britain and France through his radical policies, his turn toward
the Soviet Union, and the July 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. London and
Paris were consequently ready to make a secret alliance with Israel. They agreed that Israel
would invade the Sinai Peninsula before the Egyptian army could make use of the Soviet arms.
Then France and Britain would intervene to end the war and, in doing so, would remove
Nasser from power.
Israel kept its part of the bargain, attacking on October 29, 1956. Israeli forces took the
Gaza Strip and then raced across the Sinai. But the British and French lost their nerve, the
plan was exposed, and British domestic public opinion was very critical. U.S. intervention to
save Nasser also put pressure on the allies, as did, to a lesser extent, Soviet threats to intervene
militarily. Israel's forces withdrew from the captured territories in early 1957.
One Israeli gain from the war, however, was Egypt's decision to stop organizing cross-
border attacks lest Israel retaliate again. Another apparent improvement was a U.S. pledge to
guarantee Israel's access to the Gulf of Eilat, reachable by ships passing by Egyptian artillery at
Sharm al-Shaykh, at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. International forces were also put
into the Sinai to ensure peace. The breakdown of these arrangements in 1967 brought about
that year's war: Israel's preemptive strike and victory over its Arab neighbors.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
AND A NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Large-scale immigration from Eastern Europe and North Africa continued through the fi rst
half of the 1960s. Israel's population reached 2,384,000 in 1967. The increase made both pos-
sible and necessary utilizing the country's natural resources to the fullest extent. Water was
especially important. In 1960 a blueprint was in place for a national irrigation scheme. Central
to this effort was building a pipeline to tap the waters of the Jordan River.
Despite tensions with Arab states over using water close to the border, the National Water
Carrier was completed in 1964. It crossed two-thirds of the country and supplied 84,535 gallons
