Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
Jordan, convinced U.S. leaders that Israel was a real asset in the Cold War. Thus began the
special U.S.-Israel relationship.
After the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, a new phase in Israel's foreign policy began.
The Israel-Palestinian peace process was under way and many of Israel's former enemies
had fallen from power when the Soviet Union and its Communist government collapsed.
This combination of factors led to some major Israeli gains. Its relations normalized,
improved greatly, and even became friendly with many previously aloof countries —
including Russia and all the former Soviet satellite states in Europe, as well as China and
India.
In contrast, a strong leftist sector among the Western intellectual and cultural elite be-
came increasingly critical of or hostile toward Israel after the collapse of the peace process in
2000. By negotiating with the PLO and the Palestine Authority in the 1990s on the basis of a
projected two-state solution, Israel inadvertently created the impression that the Palestinians
merely sought a two-state solution rather than Israel's extinction, or so many in the West came
to believe. Ironically, by 2000, few Israelis still shared that view.
Fear of terrorism, especially after the September 2001 attacks in the United States, and the
rise of Islamist radicalism made some Western attitudes more favorable to Israel— especially
in previously largely unfriendly conservative circles — and some less so, depending on whether
Israel was seen as an ally and bulwark against the threats or as a cause of the violence and en-
mity expressed toward the West. The rise of political correctness and multiculturalism often
made Israel's role as a Western country allied with the United States, formerly an asset, into
a reason for criticism when Palestinians were viewed as the oppressed underdog. Moreover,
there was a strong resurgence of antisemitism throughout the world. Still another issue was
whether people blamed Israel for the failure of the 1990s peace process or saw it as a victim of
that outcome.
An unusual feature of Israel's foreign policy is hasbara: the war of image and interpretation
waged by Israel and its opponents to gain the support of foreign public opinion, opinion mak-
ers, and policymakers. Although Israelis regard hasbara as an important front, Jewish com-
munities abroad feel that it is even more important. Shimon Peres expressed the Israeli attitude
when he remarked that if Israel had a good policy, it did not require good hasbara. Israelis are
also aware of the irony of being criticized for withdrawing from territories that it captured, for
taking great risks (which resulted in many Israeli casualties), for making many concessions,
and for announcing its willingness to accept an independent Palestinian state. It was criticized
much less before it proceeded with a mostly unilateral peace process.
While Israel's foreign policy has changed somewhat — the government now takes cam-
paigns to delegitimize Israel seriously, for example —Israel's government still puts a higher
priority on the actual situation than on public relations. Foreign criticism, media stories,
and unpopularity are evaluated both in terms of policy options —whether an alternative that
could change adverse opinions exists — and factors outside Israel's control, including personal
hostilities or domestic political factors in other countries that will not be altered by factual
arguments.
