UNDERSTANDING ISRAEL - Israel: An Introduction - page 11

Most no longer believed that taking risks and giving up more would bring peace. This was a
change in Israeli perceptions and politics as signifi cant as the “earthquake” of 1977, or even
more so.
The other lesson Israelis learned from the experience of the 1990s peace process came from
the perception of broken Western promises. The United States and Europe had urged Israel to
make concessions and take risks, insisting that such actions were necessary to prove that Israel
wanted peace. If its peace overtures failed, Israelis were told, Western support would intensify,
since the Western nations would understand that Israel had no alternative but to defend itself
and refuse to make further concessions.
In fact, the exact opposite happened. Despite Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon
and later from the Gaza Strip, despite Israel's cooperation with the PA and its unprecedented
peace offers (including the offers to give up the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip, much of east
Jerusalem, and almost all of the West Bank and its readiness to accept an independent Pales-
tinian state), Western criticism of Israel increased after the peace process failed, and Western
backing arguably diminished. Indeed, more voices in the West than ever before called for
Israel's destruction.
Out of the experiences of the 1990s and the fi ve years of Palestinian violence and terrorism
directed at Israel that followed, a new Israeli consensus formed. Much of the left and right
moved toward the political center, reshaping the political framework. Doubtful of Arab (or at
least Palestinian and Syrian) interest in peace and cynical about foreign attitudes, Israelis ad-
opted a new paradigm. They took one idea from the left — readiness to withdraw from territo-
ries captured in 1967 and agree to a Palestinian state — and another idea from the right — doubt
that anyone on the Palestinian side was really a partner for peace.
Politicians of both the traditional left and the traditional right accepted the new concept.
Peace was not at hand, they agreed; Israel was in a long transition period. It was necessary to
cooperate with the Palestinian Authority to limit incitement of terrorism and to ensure that
the PA did not collapse — especially after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip — but these ef-
forts should proceed without illusions or expectations.
Since then, Israelis have voted for successive governments in favor of ceding all of the Gaza
Strip, most of the West Bank, and much of east Jerusalem in exchange for a full and lasting
peace. At the same time, these governments have demanded that before such a deal could
be concluded, the PA must provide convincing proof of a readiness to make concessions of
its own.
The 2009 peace plan of a coalition government that included both Likud and Labor called
for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the new state
of Palestine, limits on the military forces of that state, security guarantees for Israel, and the
insistence that any peace agreement must include the permanent end of the Israel-Palestinian
confl ict rather than being the prelude to a new stage of confl ict.
While Israel prefers peace, its politicians and population have not accepted the notion that
a quick deal is more important than the risks or conditions involved. This is true despite — or
more accurately because — the confl ict itself has entered a new phase. Instead of facing Arab
nationalist regimes and movements as its primary foes, Israel is now threatened by radical