Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
For example, even as the Lebanon War was still raging in 2006, IDF committees reevaluated
tactics and equipment to recommend changes. Often what is involved is the need to make life
and death choices about what to procure on the basis of available resources. Before the war,
expensive upgrades of tank armor that let it repel rockets were not made, as funding went
instead to planes designed to strike at Iranian missile sites if necessary.
But given Hizballah's possession of world-class antitank weapons supplied by Russia, this
decision resulted in higher casualties for Israel. Afterward, the tanks were improved, and
helicopter-fi red projectiles were purchased so that tanks did not have to undertake risky mis-
sions against reinforced enemy positions.
The third factor characterizing the IDF is Israel's strategic doctrine. Given the state's small
territory, the emphasis has been on successful deterrence, on persuading enemies that any
attack would bring high costs and ultimate defeat for them. But if attack cannot be avoided,
Israel's armed forces must be ready to go on the offensive and take the battle into the enemy's
territory. In recent years, pursuing this strategy has involved the use of airpower, smart bombs,
and unpiloted airplanes.
The Lebanon War showed the limits of this strategy, especially overdependence on the air
force. Thus, the need to adjust to enemy tactics, to keep ahead in technological terms, to de-
cide what weapons to build or acquire, and to determine what tactics and training are needed
is a continuous process. Israel can simply not afford waste or incompetence in this area.
Israeli society is constantly evaluating how it stands regarding these three defi ning factors,
which are always in fl ux. Clearly, the relationship of the military to society has changed in sev-
eral respects since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The media is more critical, the courts are more
ready to investigate and order changes in tactics and rules of engagement, and soldiers' parents
intervene far more to protect their children's interests.
Every Jewish, Druze, and Circassian Israeli citizen is drafted after his or her eighteenth
birthday. Exemptions are granted to Haredi men and to both Haredi and Dati women. Some
male Bedouins volunteer, as do some Jews from abroad. Entering a university or the workforce
is put on hold until after army service, except the case of a few temporary deferments to study
high technology, medicine, or other specialties. Psychological or medical problems are also
sometimes a basis for exemption. Police, diplomats, and intelligence service personnel are
permanently exempt from duty in the regular forces.
Despite a growing sense that not everyone does military service any more, it is still viewed as
an honorable and important component of Israeli life. Though less so than in the past, a non-
Haredi man still fi nds it embarrassing to admit that he did not serve, even though changing
norms in Israeli society have somewhat eroded what was once seen as a sacred duty, with
dishonor the price of failing to serve. Evading a reserve call-up is somewhat easier but involves
letting down comrades-in-arms. Studies of armies have shown that the obligation one feels
to fellow soldiers is one of the most powerful incentives to serve and show courage on the
battlefi eld.
Historically, men did three years of mandatory service, although this has been lowered to
twenty-eight months in recent years. Women's time in the army was traditionally two years but
