Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
describing both as a formof 'state' delivery system.
What is a 'state' is itself a matter of contention
(Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). What is notable
about states is not their power, but the absence of
power and the struggle for legitimacy against other
interests. Hence, until comparatively recently, the
statewasnot generallyan important player inflood
risk management except where the state had the
ability to organize corv ยด e labour. Only from the
19thcenturydid itgenerallyhaveenoughmoneyto
be able to take action on its own (Hartwell 1981).
An issue in flood risk management is therefore
which approach is most appropriate to a particular
flood risk management intervention. What is the
most appropriate form of intervention is then
dependent upon such factors as resource require-
ments, effectiveness, and the contribution of the
intervention to wider societal objectives. In this,
one of the key characteristics of flood risk man-
agement interventions, as with other aspects of
water management, is the physical economies
of scale. Physically bigger does generally mean a
lower per unit cost. So, building a flood embank-
ment will, beyond some intensity of development,
mean that it is cheaper than the individual prop-
erty owners floodproofing their individual proper-
ties (Green et al. 2000).
Taking the intervention strategy and the form
of governance required to deliver it, which is the
best combination? Table 17.1 relates the main
clusters of intervention strategy to the forms of
governance that can deliver them. The shaded area
represents those cases where the intervention
is delivered by some user and hence the organiza-
tions responsible for flood risk management have
competitive market offers the capacity to ex-
change one form of power - money - for physical
forms of power. Both economic (Kahn 1993) and
legal analyses of markets (Poole 2008) therefore
require that the exchange be voluntary, and that
power is not used inappropriately. This precludes
the use of competition on its own when these
conditions cannot be met.
But, these voluntary and non-competitivemod-
els be inadequate for one of three reasons:
1
economies of scale may make collective action
more efficient;
2
private action may not be possible;
3
the costs of information (Stiglitz 2008) and
transaction costs (Coase 1991) mean that an alter-
native is more efficient.
In these cases, the remaining more 'top-down'
options are appropriate. But historically, the co-
operative approach has dominated in flood risk
management, as in most water management, in
the form of Water User Associations. Much of the
land drainage in Western Europe was carried out
by such cooperative groups, of which the Water-
schappen in The Netherlands are simply the best
known (Wagret 1967). The traditional municipal-
ity is a good example of the collaborative model
where a group of people come together and under-
take several different activities together rather
than a single function. The historicmunicipalities
were of this form and it was these municipalities
that very largely delivered water and sanitation to
the urban areas of Europe in the 19th and early
20th centuries (Hietala 1987).
It is necessary to distinguish the collaborative
model from the coordination model and to avoid
Table 17.1
Main clusters of intervention strategy corresponding to the forms of governance that can deliver
them. Shaded areas represent those cases where the intervention is delivered by a user, and hence flood
risk management organizations have to exert social power to influence the behaviour of those users
Governance
Runoff control
Delaying/reducing
peak flows
Separation of floods and activities
Contingent
action
Recovery
Runoff
reduction
Slowing
runoff
Offline
storage
Online
storage
Dikes
Channel
improvements
Land
use
control
Flood
proofing
Relocation Flood
warnings/
Insurance
Competition
Cooperation
Collaboration
Coordination
