Tourism, Development and the Environment - Tourism and Development: Concepts and Issues - page 274

indigenous CPR management regimes in both the industrial and developing
worlds. A new CPR paradigm has emerged from the (mainly theoretical)
research into the problems of collective action, which champions indigenous
common property regimes and refutes the conventional state- or market-
oriented solutions to the CPR problem. According to this 'new institutional-
ist' perspective, the solution to the CPR problem rests with endogenously
created (rather than imposed) institutional arrangements which generate
levels of mutual trust and assurance amongst resource users, and which pro-
vide the necessary incentives and constraints to maintain cooperation. An
increasing volume of theoretical literature, supported by field observations,
suggests cooperation is often achieved, and 'co-ordination problems'
(Ullman-Margalit, 1977) resolved, through rule-systems created by resource
users themselves.
These diverse perspectives emphasise the centrality of social and institu-
tional capital. However, evidence is mounting emphasising how decentral-
ised environmental management structures also articulate with market
institutions. Recent insights into the dynamics of community conservation
have highlighted the essential balance of local governance structures inter-
acting with market institutions. The sustainability of 'nature tourism' in
much of the developing world, for example, has revealed the fundamental
role market forces play. Be it wildlife, rainforest or cultural heritage, the real-
ity of population growth and economic development has meant that the
dictum 'use it or lose it' has found profound relevance (Hulme & Murphree,
1999). Protecting environmental resources from the free market, especially
through ineffective or corrupt state regulation, exposes the environment to
degradation; 'if species or habitats are to be conserved they must not be pro-
tected from market forces as that will place control in the hands of an inef-
ficient state that will allow them to degrade as rent seeking public officials
take bribes from poachers and timber companies' (Hulme & Murphree, 1999:
280). Rather, where the uniqueness and scarcity of natural resources are
reflected by their economic value they are more likely to be conserved. Where
conservation offers resource managers a higher return as compared to a
degrading activity, such as agriculture, the resource managers will have an
incentive to conserve rather than consume their natural resource base. The
African elephant, for long chastised by communities for destroying crops,
damaging property and inflicting injury, has found a new lease of life where
its conservation generates local income - be that through hunting (as in
Zambia) or wildlife tourism (in Kenya for example).
Ecological sustainability
Appropriate forms of governance, therefore, lie at the heart of sustain-
ability. However, in the same way as the intrinsically top-down approach of
development planners and policymakers has been discredited, so too must