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Case 3: i N 0 ( a e )
Since i is not included in
N II in phase II of the last round, using ( 5.3 )wehave
f i (1, a e
f i (0, a e
u i (1, a i )
s ij a j < 0
i )
i )
=
+
S
i
j N
+ \ N
where the inequality is due to the condition in line 10.
Next we show that a e is Pareto-optimal. Suppose there exists a that is Pareto-
superior to a e . It suffices to show that (i)
N 1 ( a )
\ N 1 ( a e )
N 1 ( a e )
=
and (ii)
\
N 1 ( a )
N 1 ( a )
\ N 1 ( a e )
=
. We first show part (i). Suppose
=
. Then for
N 1 ( a )
\ N 1 ( a e ), we have u i ( a )
u i ( a e )
each i
=
0. Let i be the first user
N 1 ( a )
\ N 1 ( a e ) whose action is set to 0 during phase I of the last round,
among
¯
=
¯
a i ,wehave
and
a be the profile right before a i
0 is performed. Since
a i
+ j N
u i (1, a i )
¯
s ij ¯
¯
u i (1,
a i )
a j
u i (1,
a i )
0, which contradicts to the
S
i
+ \ N
condition in line 5.
Next we show part (ii). Suppose
N 1 ( a e )
\ N 1 ( a )
=
. Since we have shown
part i), we must have a < a e . Then for each i
N 1 ( a )
N 1 ( a e ), we have
u i ( a )
u i ( a e ). Since u i ( a )
u i ( a e ) for each i
N 0 ( a )
N 0 ( a e ), there must
=
0
=
N 1 ( a e )
\ N 1 ( a ) such that u i ( a e ) < u i ( a )
exist i
=
0. Suppose i is included in
N II
during phase II of some round. Let
a be the profile right before a i =
¯
1 is performed.
a e ,wehave u i (
u i ( a e ) < 0. Then it follows from 0
Since
a
¯
a )
¯
f i (1,
a i )
¯
+ j N
i
f i (0,
a i )
¯
=
u i (1,
a i )
¯
s ij ¯
a j that there must exist j
N
such that
S
i
+
+
1, and therefore a j
N 1 ( a ), we have u j ( a e )
u j ( a )
a i
a i =
a j
¯
=
=
1. If j
N 1 ( a e )
\ N 1 ( a ) and
1 > 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore we must have j
u j ( a e )
u j ( a )
=
0. Let
a be the profile right before a j
ˆ
=
1 is performed. Since
a ) < u j ( a e )
ˆ
j is included before i ,wehave u j (
0. Then we can use the above
argument sequentially, until we find some k that leads to contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
N I , k during the execution that computes a e . For each
N I , k
Let
be the set of users in
i N I ,1 ,wehave
u i (1, a i )
s ij a j
+
u i (1, a i )
+
s ij a j
0 .
S
i
S
i
j N
+ \ N
j
N
+ \ N
N I ,1 . Similarly, we can show that for any i
Therefore we must have
N I ,1
N II ,1 \ N I ,1 , we must have i
N II ,1 . Using this argument sequentially, we can show
1 N I , i N II , i ↆ∪
1 N I , i N II , i for any k , and therefore a e
a e .
When a user becomes determined with action 1, the increment of social welfare of
determined users by changing its action from 0 to 1 is no less than the increment of its
social group utility derived from determined users, which is non-negative. Therefore
we can see that v ( a e )
i
i
that
=
=
v ( a e ).
 
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