Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
9.1 Introduction
In 1991 the Canadian sociologist Derrick De Kerckhove coined the term “psychotechnol-
ogy” to define “any technology that emulates, extends, or amplifies sensory-motor, psy-
chological or cognitive functions of the mind” (De Kerckhove 1991b, p. 132). According to
De Kerckhove, underlying this definition there is a reflection about the emerging aspects
of person-technology interaction, which evolves into the constitution of electronic sen-
sory extensions of our central nervous system and externalizes cognitive functions able
to extend the human mind. In this way, any technology is an object able to externalize a
property of the body and it represents the amplification and the extension of the human
mind connecting to other people's cognitive processes (De Kerckhove 1990, 1991a, 2001).
According to a biopsychosocial perspective, a psychotechnology could better be defined
as a “technology that emulates, extends, amplifies and
modifies
sensory-motor, psychological
or cognitive functions of the mind” (Federici 2002). By borrowing what Olivetti Belardinelli
(1973) claims, Federici's definition of psychotechnology affirms that intrasystemic relation
is not to be considered simply as an addition of the objective component—the artifact—
with the subjective components—the user—of the interaction: The object cannot be
considered per se because it always falls out of the human experience. The introduction of
the “modification” factor into De Kerckhove's definition of psychotechnology highlights
the dynamic and mutual nature of the human-technology interaction and also allows
for overcoming the current cause/effect perspective by considering human behavior as
the result of the interaction between personal, environmental, and social features. As
Bruner highlights (1977), the human being specializes his or her abilities by means of
technologies, which allow a consequent evolution of the species. In fact, any kind of
artifact can be conceived both as an amplifier transporting in itself systems of symbols
organized by rules, restrictions, and knowledge possibilities and a way to guide users to a
cognitive and cultural readaptation. In this way, psychotechnology has a double function:
By one side, it permits the human being's adaptation to the environment-system; on the
other side, it forces users to a cognitive and cultural modification and adaptation (Federici
et al. 2010).
Furthermore, the modification function of psychotechnology is permitted by increasing
the information conveyed by the human-technology interaction process. In fact, the
interaction with an artifact enhances and enriches the information flow and modifies
the knowledge stored in the long-term memory. In this light, information systems (e.g.,
sensory and cognitive extensions) directly take part in the working memory processes.
Following this perspective, the artifact is not to be considered only as an object of which
affordances emerge during the user-technology interaction (Gibson 1979), but it is also a
psychotechnology that shares and modifies the features and the functions of the mind.
During the interaction with psychotechnologists, the object becomes a part and an
extension of the subject while he or she is interacting. In this way, psychotechnologists
allow a different synthesis of the information and provide the reorganization of the
relations between the elements constituting the experience.
Following this perspective the artifact becomes, at the same time, structure of knowledge
and mental representation and has the function of reconfiguring and restructuring the
problem by enriching and recodifying information or decreasing constraints. In other words,
psychotechnology is not only a cause of the insight process—as the concept of affordance
can be interpreted—but it also takes an active part in the insight process becoming a “place”
of a whole synchronous perception of a meaningful
gestalt
(Koffka 1935).
