Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
It was the opposite of US climate diplomacy, which quickly grasped the requirement
to develop an understanding with China on the parameters of any eventual deal. With
the US and China jointly accounting for 44 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions,
developing bilateral agreement between the two nations was a
sine qua non
for a global
deal. The US side worked intensively to create a strategic climate change dialogue with
China. In a May 2010 op-ed in China's
Global Times
ahead of a Beijing session of the
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Hillary Clinton wrote that the US and China had
negotiating fora, the attempt would be bedevilled by mistrust and suspicion.
The EU on the other hand wanted to use the arena of the UN climate conferences to
ratchet forward progress toward its goal of having a legally binding treaty ready for the
Paris COP at the end of 2015. This involved cajoling, bribing—with promises of climate
funding—and pressuring developing countries toward a destination they didn't want to
reach. As Yvo de Boer, the recently departed UN climate convention executive secretary,
explained in a frank interview just before Cancún, many developing countries were not
deeply committed to the concept of green growth that climate change demanded:
Although many nations pay lip service to this model, most of them, deep in their hearts are unsure. In fact many
developing nations fear that the intent of the west is to use climate as an excuse to keep [them] poor and maintain the
current status quo.
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In executing its strategy, the EU was suckered by habituation to its internal institutional
processes—the intractable but irreversible process of reaching agreement within the
27-memberbloc—whichitprojectedontotheclimatechangenegotiations,wherepositions
can be reversed, apparent progress can be undone and what happens to be agreed at a
particular moment does not determine the final outcome. The EU also held what it viewed
as its trump card—unless other countries moved in its direction, it would not enter into a
second commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.
This was presented as the EU doing the world a big favour. In reality, the EU was
desperate for a rationale for persevering with Kyoto. In 2007, it had already committed
itself to cut emissions by 20 per cent on 1990 levels by 2020. Pre-committing itself looked
even more foolish as other developed countries confirmed they were not going to sign up
to a second commitment period. Japan, Russia and Canada (which subsequently withdrew
from Kyoto altogether) was followed by New Zealand, leaving Australia and Kazakhstan
as the only non-European states to participate in the second commitment period.
At Cancún, the EU strategy met with some success. The pattern of the annual climate
change conferences is that following a particularly disastrous COP, the next one is more
harmonious, with participants sharing an interest in demonstrating to the outside world
