Notes - Burdens of Proof - page 196

33. For similar issues in breaking later German cryptosystems, see B. Jack Copeland,
Colossus: The Secrets of Bletchley Park's Code-breaking Computers (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 195.
34. Alan Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (London: Vintage, 1992), 224. Hodges
notes the daunting practical and procedural aspects of the large-scale deployment
of ciphering apparatus able to meet the needs of mobile warfare: “In fact, unless
everything were spelled out in advance and in complete, rigid, detail, without any
chance of ambiguity or error, there would have to be some form of indicator. . . .
Good cryptography lay in the creation of an entire body of rules, not in this or that
message. And serious cryptanalysis consisted of the work of recovering them; recon-
structing the entire mechanical process which the cipher clerks performed, through
an analysis of the entire mass of signals.” Ibid., 164.
35. “The head of the German naval intelligence service at Naval High Command
adhered to the opinion that it would be impossible for the enemy to have deci-
phered the signals. They continued to assume that that there was a spy network
operating in their bases in occupied France, although nothing could have been
further from the truth. And so their faith in machines and experts continued to be
matched by distrust of men.” Ibid., 244.
36. Ibid., 238.
37. The impact of the Enigma machine on world politics was to be felt long after
the end of World War II. If the details of the Allied codebreaking successes were not
revealed until 1974, it is quite simply because the Cold War and the demise of the
old colonial empires brought about entirely new markets for military-strength
ciphering machines, a market serviced in large part by Boris Hagelin: “The dozens
of new nations that emerged from the ruins created a market for cipher machines
far wider than any that had yet existed . . . to safeguard the communications of
their little armies and of the diplomatic posts that they established all over the
world.” Kahn, The Codebreakers , 432. Obviously, none of the Cold War powers found
any advantage in letting these newcomers to international politics know that their
military and diplomatic communications were perhaps not as confidential as they
might have expected them to be.
38. As if often the case with major scientific discoveries, the precise determination
of who invented the one-time pad is problematic. In 2011, Steven Bellovin
announced that a banker, Frank Miller, had discovered the principle and published
it as part of a telegraphic codebook as early as 1882, but the system he devised seems
to have never been used in practice. See Steven M. Bellovin, “Frank Miller: Inventor
of the One-Time Pad,” Cryptologia 35, no. 3 (2011): 203-222.
39. Kahn, The Codebreakers , 397.
40. Ibid., 402.