Notes - Burdens of Proof - page 191

17. Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), 3.
18. Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 45.
19. Brian Rotman has argued extensively for loosening mathematics' fixation on
analytical proof, arguing that “mathematics, contrary to its self-promotion as a
purely theoretical science of necessary truth, is now—courtesy of the digital com-
puter—also an experimental practice.” Brian Rotman, Ad Infinitum—The Ghost in
Turing's Machine: Taking God Out of Mathematics and Putting the Body Back In: An Essay
in Corporeal Semiotics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 101.
20. Given the prevalence of modeling in scientific practice, there is a remarkable
dearth of literature on the topic in science studies—exceptions include Mary B.
Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1966); Ronald N. Giere, Science Without Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999); Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison, Models as Mediators: Perspectives on
Natural and Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Bas
C. van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2008).
21. Davis and Hersch's analysis of seven different formulations of the Chinese
remainder theorem is a simple and powerful reminder that the drive toward formal-
ization and abstraction is itself an historical trend. They note that “computer science
in its theoretical formulation is dominated by a spirit of abstraction which defers
to no other branch of mathematics in its zealotry.” Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh,
The Mathematical Experience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 194.
22. As Ross Anderson has pointed out, “a trusted component or system is one which
you can insure,” that is, one in which the specific liability can be evaluated and
transferred to a third party, rather than prevented at all cost. See Ross Anderson,
“Why Cryptosystems Fail,” Communications of the ACM 37, no. 11 (1994): 32-40,
and, in general, Ross Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable
Distributed Systems , 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 2008).
23. As Sheila Jasanoff notes, “Litigation becomes an avenue for working out, often
at an early stage, the compromises necessary for securing the social acceptance of a
new technology, for example, by making it more responsive to well-articulated social
needs, without capitulating to more radical critiques.” Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the
Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995), 140.
24. Ibid., 207.
25. See, for example, Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and
Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Jay D.