Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
Chilean economy that could be used to predict the effects over the next de-
cade of decisions taken today. These days, computer graphics could handle
what was envisaged with ease, but in the early 1970s in Chile the displays
included hand-posted notes (of algedonic warnings), banks of projectors, and
slides prepared in advance of meetings (showing quantified flow charts of
production). The Checo display “certainly worked visually; but the computer
drive behind it was experimental and fragmentary” (Beer 1974a, 329-32). The
target date for completion of the control room was set as 9 October 1972;
in fact, it was in “experimental working order” by 10 January 1973 (Beer
1981, 270).
Project Cybernsyn evolved very quickly, but so did other developments
(Beer 1981, 307):
As time wore on throughout 1972, Chile developed into a siege economy. How
ironic it was that so many eyes were focussed with goodwill on the Chilean ex-
periment in all parts of the world, while governments and other agencies, sup-
posedly representing those liberal-minded observers, resisted its maturation
with implacable hostility. The nation's life support system was in a stranglehold,
from financial credit to vital supplies; its metabolism was frustrated, from the
witholding of spare parts to software and expertise; literally and metaphori-
cally, the well-to-do were eating rather than investing their seed-corn—with
encouragement from outside. Even more ironic, looking back, is the fact that
every advance Allende made, every success in the eyes of the mass of the peo-
ple (which brought with it more electoral support) made it less likely that the
Chilean experiment would be allowed to continue—because it became more
threatening to Western ideology.
Before Allende came to power, copper had been Chile's major source of for-
eign exchange, and “we were to see the spectacle of the 'phantom ship' full
of copper that traipsed around European ports looking for permission to un-
load” (307). Economic collapse was imminent, and Beer's thought was to
“search for novel and evolutionary activity whereby the Chilean economy
might very rapidly enhance its foreign earnings” (308). His answer was in-
digenous crafts, wine, and fish, and in 1972 and 1973 he sought to mobilize
his contacts in Europe to expand those markets—without success. There was
nothing especially cybernetic about those efforts, but they do indicate Beer's
commitment to Allende's Chile.
In 1973 the situation in Chile continued to worsen. In September 1973,
the Cybersyn team received its last instruction from the president, which
