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message: co-evolution of population structure with individual strategy provides an
ecient mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in one-shot dilemmas. More-
over, if the willingness to sever undesirable connections is also regarded as part of
the individual strategy, the same principles provide an evolutionary basis for the
decision of adjusting social ties. For example, in the PD cooperators evolve to main-
tain their interactions. But defectors are forced to seek new partners frequently,
because long term relationships with defectors are undesirable.
The consideration of adaptive social networks is an important step towards more
realistic models of social interactions in structured populations. Coupling the dy-
namics on networks with the dynamics of networks leads to emergent new phenom-
ena outside the classical considerations of social dynamics on static networks.
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