Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
the wHo in the context of SarS, both forms of slack attract negative connotations
(8-9). agency slack has even been cited as evidence of dysfunctional or pathological
Io behaviour (barnett and Finnemore 1999, 715-716). the claims cortell and
Peterson advance thus suggest that while the eradication of SarS may have been
a beneficial, even desirable, outcome, the role, authority, and autonomy the wHo's
bureaucracy displayed was nevertheless unanticipated, and consequently improper.
an even more serious implication arising from the arguments of Fidler, cortell,
and Peterson is their bearing on the legal status of the wHo's actions. by asserting
that certain elements of its response were not authorised, Fidler, cortell, and Peterson
have classified the WHO response as
ultra vires
under international law. where
it can be determined that an Io has acted
ultra vires
or outside its authority and
competence, the legality of that action may also be challenged (akande 2003, 285;
see also white 1996, 119). Until now no member state has disputed the legal status of
the WHO's actions, but these claims nevertheless cast significant doubt over them.
even if such charges were never raised, the suggestion of impropriety can still
have serious ramifications. For instance, were the claims about the WHO's so-called
independence proven (or even assumed) to be correct, certain select member states,
traditionally suspicious of the role and authority of Ios, could conceivably react by
seeking to constrain how the wHo operates even further. new checks and balances
on its constitutional authority may be adopted. Its powers to respond to such events
may be curbed. conversely, in an attempt to prevent objections over the management
of an issue or event arising later, the wHo may decide to curtail its own activities.
It may, for example, decide to refrain from issuing travel advisories if member states
would likely later challenge their legality (and, by default, the legitimacy of the
organisation). both sets of circumstances remain, for the moment, hypothetical
suppositions. Yet were they to arise, they would undoubtedly have a damaging
effect on the wHo's activities if only because the organisation's attention would be
temporarily diverted from its primary focus of improving health for all.
by challenging the veracity of these claims, this chapter is not suggesting that asking
probing questions about the actions of Ios is wrong. rather, the behaviour of Ios, like
states, should be regularly scrutinised and questioned. the key issue for academics and
policy makers, however, is how to identify Io mission creep when it actually occurs.
How can an Io perform as intended (or perhaps more accurately, how should an Io
be performing) be distinguished from an Io that is exerting its own preferences above
those of its member states? can it be considered agency slack when the preferences of
member states and the IO appear to be aligned? And, even more significantly, given the
negative connotations associated with the term, can agency slack also be viewed as a
positive development, a change for good that should be encouraged?
The WHo's Actions Assessed
the following analysis shows that some of these issues are not as straightforward as
they seem. Indeed, the case presented below offers one view of the wHo bureaucracy's
