Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
extremely problematic. For example, the power of sovereign states over domestic
health governance issues concerning HIv/aIDS and malaria appears to remain
largely intact. Data on the true state of HIv prevalence are leaking out to the global
community through nGos, but affected sovereign states (e.g., Zimbabwe, South
africa) have been extremely reluctant to bow to the wishes of the wHo or the
international community in their handling of the HIv/aIDS pandemic.
In the final analysis, the emergence and proliferation of infectious agents will
logically increase as processes of globalisation accelerate; however, disease events
will act as biotic countermeasures (negative feedback loops) to slow such processes
of globalisation through reductions in the movement of trade goods and migrants,
real sense, then, disease acts as a negative feedback mechanism on such processes
of globalisation. the optimal way to diminish the negative effects of disease on
globalisation is through the following: reduce the degradation of natural environments,
which slows processes of zoonotic transference; implement redistributive mechanisms
to improve the basic health of the human species, particularly in the least developed
countries; and construct and maintain global public health surveillance systems.
The proliferation of avian influenza, particularly the H5n1 strain, from east
asia to africa and Europe, and the significant concern it has generated suggest that
political elites have begun to grasp the consequences of emerging infections for
prosperity, global governance, and even national security. one can only hope that
lessons gleaned from the SarS epidemic (such as increased transparency, greater
intergovernmental cooperation, and investments in public health infrastructure) will
be employed in the event of a pandemic influenza. Nations that choose to ignore the
warning of the SarS epidemic do so at their peril.
Recommendations
the optimal means to curtail future epidemics (and pandemics) is to augment the
endogenous capacity of healthcare infrastructure and improve the basic health of
populations throughout the developing world. this makes logical sense because
disease-surveillance capacity in many developing areas is low to nonexistent. barry
bloom (2003) argues that 'in a world that is increasingly angry at the United States,
the lesson here is that it is time to support a global war on disease. the United States
should be investing efforts and funds to strengthen the health structures in countries
around the world … this investment would protect our country and every other
against global epidemics, save millions of lives, and change the U.S. image from one
of self-interest to one of human interest.' Julie Gerberding (2003), head of the U.S.
centers for Disease control and Prevention, echoes these sentiments: 'the SarS
experience reinforces the need to strengthen global surveillance, to have prompt
reporting, and to have this reporting linked to adequate and sophisticated diagnostic
laboratory capacity. It underscores the need for strong global public health systems,
robust health service infrastructures, and expertise that can be mobilized quickly
