Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
advisories were specifically directed at travellers (i.e., individuals) and not at states.
During this brief moment, global health governance temporarily shifted to a new
configuration wherein non-state actors provided wHo with information, which was
then analysed by the organisation and subsequently disseminated to global civil
society without the consent or even the consultation of targeted countries.
However, Fidler's arguments that there is today a transformative order that
effectively limits the sovereign state's ability to compromise the process are
overstated. In the domain of HIv/aIDS, the sovereign state is very much capable
of thwarting international efforts to address the spread of the contagion. one need
only look at the history of obfuscation and denial generated by political leaders in
sub-Saharan africa (thabo Mbeki and robert Mugabe in particular) to observe this
process of state obstruction (see Price-Smith and Daley 2004; Price-Smith 2002b).
Indeed andrew Price-Smith and John l. Daly (2004) demonstrate that in the case
of Zimbabwe, Mugabe's Zimbabwe african national Union-Patriotic Front regime
provided antiviral therapies solely to their political supporters, denying such life-
saving pharmaceuticals to the Movement for Democratic change, the opposition
party.
Conclusion
By inflicting significant socioeconomic costs on affected states, the SARS epidemic
exposed the vulnerability of existing governance structures, reshaped the beliefs,
norms, motivations, and preferences of those individuals who weathered the crisis,
and ultimately led to macro-level changes in domestic political governance while
enhancing the dynamics of regional health cooperation among the Pacific Rim
states. However, SarS-induced effects on the international system and the interplay
between sovereign states and international organisations were largely ephemeral.
The greatest effect of SARS was not so much that it constituted a significant material
threat to the prosperity, effective governance and security of states, but rather that
it generated significant changes in governance within affected states (particularly in
canada and china). conversely, and contrary to Fidler's assertions, the epidemic
does not seem to have generated significantly increased compliance of sovereign
states with international health regimes (or significant revisions to the IHR for that
matter). nor has the wHo retained the expanded powers it exhibited during the
SarS crisis, although it could arguably employ such strategies again to contain
the growing H5n1 pandemic.
So why was the response to SarS so different from the international response
to other pathogens? the SarS epidemic exhibited several factors that led to the
empowerment of the wHo, namely the emergence of a novel virus, coupled with
seemingly high levels of virulence and transmissibility, generating high levels of
uncertainty and fear. this event constituted an exogenous shock that affected regional
political and economic elites and presented an immediate socioeconomic crisis for
the decision makers to address at the national, regional, and international levels.
 
 
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