Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
since their inception in 1951 (in the form of the International Sanitary rules), the IHr
had not been revised adequately in the face of emerging novel pathogens. the
IHr required the reporting of only three infectious diseases: cholera, plague, and
yellow fever. Second, under the IHr the reporting of pathogen-induced morbidity
and mortality was exclusively the domain of sovereign states. Historically, states have
long sought to suppress the flow of information regarding endogenous epidemics,
because the emergence of contagion typically generates significant negative effects
upon the economy and society of infected states. Such pernicious effects range from
the collapse of tourism to the decline in foreign investment, to the embargo of trade
goods from affected nations. Thus states have had significant material incentives
not to report the occurrence of epidemics accurately to the global community. In
this sense, Beijing's early attempts to suppress the flow of information to the wHo
and Canadian officials' insistence that WHO travel advisories were erroneous both
reflect this historical pattern of tension between sovereign states and the WHO.
Despite these problems, some important changes have taken place in international
health governance regime since the 1970s as a result of technological advances, the
rise of new and re-emerging infectious diseases, and the increasing involvement of
non-state actors in addressing global microbial threats. At first glance, the SARS
epidemic appeared to confirm the transition to new forms of health governance,
described by Fidler (2004, 7) as 'the post-westphalian era' in which non-state actors
have increasing influence on global governance. During meetings of the world
Health assembly (the wHo's supreme governing body) in May 2003, member states
stipulated that the organisation should redouble its efforts to collect and analyse data
from non-state actors. Specifically, the assembly requested that the director general
of the WHO (2003b) 'take into account reports from sources other than official
notifications'. The advent of non-state actors' ability to communicate data directly
to the wHo appears to have undermined the historical monopoly of sovereign
states regarding the reporting of public health information. However, this is likely
a function of the geographical emergence of SarS in the relatively advanced areas
of east asia, where access to communications technology is ubiquitous. Fidler's
arguments are weakened by the lack of substantive and effective cooperation
between sovereign states, nGos, and international organisations in the realm of
other infectious diseases such as malaria, tb, and, particularly, HIv/aIDS.
therefore, the SarS epidemic appears to have temporarily increased the power
and authority of the wHo
vis-à-vis
the sovereign state. as a result of non-state
regulated information flows, the WHO found itself no longer in a subservient position
relative to sovereign state actors. the organisation employed this newfound freedom
to issue global alerts and travel advisories when it deemed appropriate and was not
subject to the consent of affected member states. It issued its first global alert on
12 March 2003, in order to make the international community aware of the expanding
SARS contagion. The organisation subsequently issued specific advisories that
travellers postpone all non-essential travel to affected regions such as toronto, Hong
Kong, Guangdong, and beijing. It is noteworthy that neither the wHo constitution
nor the IHr invested the organisation with this power. Furthermore, the wHo travel
