Epidemic of Fear: SARS and the Political Economy of Contagion - Innovation in Global Health Governance - page 27

world, which possessed limited levels of endogenous state capacity. 8 the infection of
populations in canada, Hong Kong, and taiwan by the SarS coronavirus illustrated
a central component of public health: microbes evolve to colonise all available
ecological niches (Morse 2001). therefore, as a result of the SarS contagion,
developed countries realised that they too were vulnerable to the proliferation of
debilitating and lethal pathogens.
Political theories of Pe have been utilised with increasing frequency in the realm
of comparative politics (Skocpol 1985) and recently in the realm of international
relations theory. robert Jervis (1997, 39) argues that 'jumps rather than smooth
progressions often characterize operations of systems … [and] when variables
interact in a non-linear manner, changes may not be gradual. Instead, for a prolonged
period there may be no apparent deterioration, followed by a sudden collapse or
transformation' (see also Blyth 2002; Diehl and Goertz 2000). Stephen Krasner
(1984, 240) concurs, stating that 'studies of political development point to differential
rates of change in social and political structures over time'.
Such models typically hold that a shock may destabilise the status quo ,
generating in response a burst of human social and technical ingenuity and significant
incentives for international cooperation (Homer-Dixon 2001). However, following
this burst of ingenuity, there follows a plateau during which concern over the issue
of public health declines, only to awaken during the next crisis situation. therefore,
Pe models are optimal for explaining the evolution of public health as an issue
in the domain of international relations. to date, theories of international relations
have a rather difficult time integrating the growing threat of epidemic disease, which
originates at the domestic level but may subsequently manifest as an externality at
the global level in the form of pandemic disease. If such a non-linear (Pe) perspective
is adopted, then the evolution of structures of governance in the face of epidemic
disease might best be understood as following the trajectory of a Pe model. In
this instance, an exogenous shock challenges the capacity and resilience of a state
(or system). If the populace is innovative and hardy, and apparatus of governance
flexible (i.e., it possesses sufficient endogenous capacity), then the state will survive.
In a Darwinian sense the shock generates a spurt of ingenuity that propels a given
society to a higher level of social and technical innovation. However, states that
possess lower endogenous capacity, and therefore lack resilience, will succumb and
falter, periodically disintegrating into a state of chaos, stabilising, and then failing
again. as william Zartman (1995) argues, it is a process akin to that of a ball falling
down a set of stairs, a descent followed by partial stabilisation, only to be followed
by another plunge.
a rational critique of such a Pe model might argue that the role of epistemic
communities would be valuable in explaining the role of cooperation, in that
microbiologists effectively communicated their concerns to decision makers who
then modified existing regimes to deal with forthcoming epidemics. Unfortunately,
such a proactive model is not borne out by historical evidence, as nations typically
exhibit reactive and not proactive stances regarding disease surveillance and control.
epistemic communities have been successful in generating change based on two