Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
and undesired actions. Kamradt-Scott argues that the wHo was intended to be an
independent entity, performing duties on behalf of member states. communicable
disease control was its primary purpose from its inception. the wHo's response
to SarS stood in stark contrast to its usual state-centric deferential approach to
public health emergencies. while SarS was an exceptional epidemiological
event, the wHo's actions were entirely consistent with its mandate and explicitly
authorised by the collective wHo membership through its approval of the wHo
constitution. It directs the wHo to be the designated leader, coordinator, and policy
formulator of global initiatives to control infectious disease. Several provisions
within article 2 of the wHo's (2006) constitution are explicit about this. the
organisation's interventionist approach, most apparent in its public criticism of the
chinese government, was sanctioned by member states through the formation of the
Global outbreak alert and response network (Goarn) in 2000 and the passing of
resolution wHa54.14 on Global Health Security: epidemic alert and response in
2001 (wHo 2001). the ongoing revision of the IHr—the only treaty designed to
combat the international spread of infectious diseases—gave the wHo discretionary
powers regarding infectious disease policy and procedures. the wHo's actions were
thus in keeping with the expectations of the member states—that of an impartial
technical organisation charged with a duty of care to safeguard the health of the
global population.
Part III, 'Preparing for Pandemics: Avian Influenza', presents a different set
of challenges. In Chapter 5, 'SARS and Avian Influenza in China and Canada:
the Politics of controlling Infectious Disease', Sonny Shiu-Hing lo argues
that in today's globalised world, where highly virulent pathogens can be rapidly
transplanted anywhere and lead to unforeseen epidemics, a critical measure of state
strength in health governance rests on its ability to cope with rapidly emerging public
health crises. three key performance measures—preparedness, transparency, and
responsiveness—should be used to assess state capacity in this regard. In the asian
epidemics of acute, highly virulent respiratory infections such as SarS and H5n1
avian influenza, certain Asian jurisdictions, especially densely populated urban
centres, both innovated successfully and failed. other countries, such as canada, can
learn from these experiences to prepare for future public health emergencies such
as a global influenza pandemic. Despite toronto's experience with SarS and the
government's development of the Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector, the
canadian public remains psychologically ill prepared for a large-scale public health
emergency. canada should instil a 'crisis consciousness', for example by ensuring
canadians are aware of the need of government to balance civil liberties with the
need to maintain public safety, and prepare for a rapid mobilisation of civic resources
to what will likely be an overextended healthcare workforce. It remains unclear
whether the logistical challenges that plagued municipal, provincial, and federal
governmental responses to SARS—specifically regarding roles, responsibilities, and
communication—have been resolved. lo thus proposes a 20-point action plan to
bolster canadian preparedness for dealing with the eventual epidemic attributed to a
highly virulent and infectious pathogen.
