Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Documents from bat, Philip Morris International, and Japan tobacco/r.J.
reynolds unsurprisingly indicate substantial areas of agreement and cooperation
in seeking to counter the development of the wHo's Fctc initiative. an initial
meeting between senior executives from the three companies in Geneva in 1999
indicated 'universal agreement as to the areas in which the companies thought they
could or should work together' (broughton
et al. 1999). Such areas included greater
collaboration on youth smoking prevention initiatives, while 'Independent voluntary
regulation was clearly seen as an objective by all companies and all wanted to
proceed urgently to explore/devise this'. voluntary regulation was to be projected as
an alternative to the more stringent trajectory of the Fctc negotiations, with bat
emphasising that it was 'critical to have [an] alternative to [the] WHO proposal for
consideration' by governments well in advance of the wHa, while Philip Morris
advised that such an initiative should not be presented 'as [a] response to [the]
WHO, but as [a] “New Millennium” for tobacco'. Such cooperation focussed on
the development of a global marketing code of conduct and reached fruition in the
launch of International tobacco Products Marketing Standards in September 2001,
albeit more modest than that originally envisaged.
as the Fctc negotiations progressed, however, it rapidly became clear that
such areas of common interest coexisted with substantial divergence in strategy
and orientation toward the prospective treaty. bat was at the forefront of industry
hostility to the wHo's approach, as might be predicted given that its comparative
commercial strengths lie in developing countries where accelerated regulation would
be expected to have the greatest impact (Fisher 2001).
bat's proposed strategy for countering the wHo initiative was predicated on
recognition of the Fctc as 'an unprecedented challenge to the tobacco industry's
freedom to continue doing business' (bat 1999).astutely calculating that the political
commitment invested in the process suggested that the achievement of a convention
was inevitable, bat sought to moderate its likely scope and impact by adopting a
'two tier approach: lobbying and reputation management'. bat's early lobbying
programme aimed at 'maximising opposition to the TFI [Tobacco Free Initiative]
proposals by mobilising the support of key allies at a global, regional and local
level', and claimed 'some success at a government level' in securing the agreement
of Brazil, china, Germany, argentina, and Zimbabwe 'to make submissions to the
drafting process'.
In January 2000, a memo describing bat's objectives in countering the Fctc
process within Europe were to ensure 'the convention [would] be broadly based
and [would] not in itself contain concrete measures', to restrict the negotiation
mandate of the european Union, and to 'gain time' (bielefeldt 2000). a subsequent
presentation describing key 'wins' in the region during 2000 claimed substantial
returns on its lobbying efforts:
• Key european markets (russia, Germany) influenced deliberations for broader, less
prescriptive convention
• critical ministries (Finance, tax, agriculture, trade) involved
