Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
high that politicians choose to err on the side of caution. In 1976, when facing a
potential swine influenza outbreak that promised to kill 1 million Americans, the
Ford administration decided to inoculate every man, woman, and child in the United
States. The administration paid dearly for this decision. The swine influenza never
occurred. the direct cost of the campaign notwithstanding, the U.S. government
ended up paying claimants some US$90 million for taking over companies' liability.
the episode also weakened U.S. government credibility in public health and helped
undermine the political stature of President Gerald Ford (Garrett 2005a). Decision
makers sometimes can be so overwhelmed by the consequences of being wrong that
they may not be able to tell the difference between consequences and likelihood,
which can lead them to make 'wrong' decisions in disease preparation.
The varied impact of the pandemic and the experience with the swine influenza are
no excuse for complacency or inaction. what this chapter suggests is that economic,
sociopolitical, and security costs incurred by a pandemic can be mitigated, if not
avoided, by a holistic and harmonised strategy featuring high-quality surveillance,
transparency, effective pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions,
mobilisation of civil society, and international cooperation. an effective strategy
should include the following elements:
• reorienting the security policy agenda from warfare to welfare. this means
committing significantly more resources to areas of immediate concern to the
people, and also paying more attention to the poor, the weak, and the pariahs,
who are at particularly high risk for infectious diseases;
• expanding government surge capacity to respond to public health emergencies,
and more generally to ensure the provision of basic public goods and services
during an outbreak;
• encouraging the active engagement of civil society groups (e.g., nGos promoting
public health, local communities) in pandemic preparation;
• improving risk communication with the public. effective communication entails
providing the public with scientific information about the disease, its spread, and
its consequences in an honest and timely manner;
• narrowing the critical gap between the developed and developing countries in
pandemic preparation. For developed countries, this means sharing with developing
countries, especially those front-line states, their experiences, technologies,
vaccines, and antiviral drugs in combating pandemic influenza. There should be
a regional network to coordinate the distribution of antiviral drugs and vaccines
and ensure the demands of countries in most need are met swiftly;
• prioritising the needs of different age and occupational groups in the allocation
of vaccines and antiviral drugs to maximise the survival rate yet minimise the
impact on the economy, governance, and security. Special attention should be
paid to the military and police, healthcare workers, officials in key posts, workers
in their most productive years, and pregnant women;
• coordinating international and government responses to outbreaks to reduce
disruption to the world economy caused by restrictions on travel and trade; and
