SARS and Avian Influenza in China and Canada: The Politics of Controlling Infectious Disease - Innovation in Global Health Governance - page 101

enhance their information-gathering activities with regard to the development of
infectious disease. equipped with updated information provided by the canadian
consular and embassy officials in asia, ottawa can draw an accurate picture of the
ongoing development of avian influenza in the Asia Pacific region.

Conclusion

a crucial indicator of effective health governance is the ability of a city or state to cope
with a public health crisis, especially one involving respiratory infectious diseases.
canada has much to learn from the bitter lessons of SarS and the ways in which
Singapore and Hong Kong dealt with SarS. being a democracy does not necessarily
mean that a country's federal and sub-federal governments have the capacity to control
the influenza pandemic effectively. Governmental decisiveness during any influenza
pandemic is far more important than the protection of civil liberties. coordination
among government departments at all levels is a critical variable in shaping the
Canadian government's response to an influenza pandemic. Emergency regulations
must be enacted by the House of commons so that canadians will remain united
across the country to fight against the attack. Provincial differences in Canada have
already revealed the varying emphases on how provincial governments perceive
an influenza pandemic. Yet if Canada's governments at the federal, provincial, and
municipal levels, together with the private sector, implement the 20-point action
plan proposed in this chapter, the country's governmental capacity for managing
an influenza pandemic would be substantially enhanced. Canadians must not be
complacent. Detailed pandemic preparedness plans may have been published, but
serious questions remain about governmental coordination, public education, crisis
consciousness, and social mobilisation, and these issues are critical to the effective
health governance, public safety and national security of all canadians.

Notes

1 this is a revised version of a research project of the Asia Paciic Foundation of Canada.

2 on asia's vulnerability during the SarS outbreak, see caballero-anthony (2005).

3 In Singapore people exposed to SarS were required to stay home, were watched by

a camera, and sometimes were tagged with an electronic wristband. they could be
imprisoned if they left home ('Singapore's SarS Measures welcome' 2003). the
Singapore police not only tested the temperature of those quarantined twice daily but also
set up a temporary lock-up centre at the old Jurong Police Station to deal with suspected
SarS carriers ('Police take Precautionary Measures against SarS' 2003; see also
Fung 2003). Unlike Hong Kong, where schools were closed after much governmental
hesitation, the Singaporean government moved decisively to close nearly all schools on
25 March, mainly due to the concern of parents.

4 For the view that Singapore is an authoritarian polity, see rodan (2005). an opposite view

can be found in bellows (2006).