Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
SarS because of a guiding protocol saying that patients with a cough, fever, and
shortness of breath exhibited symptoms of tuberculosis (tb) (bugl 2007, 710).
clearly, canada must learn from any inadequacies in its crisis management of
SarS.
the asian experience revealed variations in the openness of different states
and cities under the onslaught of infectious diseases. In late 1997, when the H5n1
virus loomed in Hong Kong, there was speculation that it might have originated
in South china. at the beginning, the Hong Kong Special administrative region
(HKSar) government was tightlipped on the origin of the avian influenza for fear of
antagonising Beijing. Encountering the mysterious death of a few citizens, a cross-
departmental coordination committee headed by anson chan, former chief secretary
for administration, boldly decided to slaughter 1.2 million chickens and birds to
prevent the spread of the virus. the Hong Kong government extracted samples of
chickens imported from china to see whether they were infected with H5n1—a
move that marked the abandonment of its politically correct stance. Hong Kong's
relative openness in dealing with the avian influenza was mainly attributable to its
vibrant mass media and dense population. In heavily populated cities like Hong
Kong and Singapore, governments cannot afford the luxury of being slow in dealing
with infectious disease. Singapore responded to SarS quickly and effectively,
forcing suspected SARS carriers and patients into compulsory confinement where
surveillance cameras were put in place.
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the relative openness of the Hong Kong and Singapore governments in tackling
SarS contrasts sharply with the Prc. at the early phase of the outbreak of the
mysterious virus, beijing encountered a cover-up by local governments in Guangdong
province. In april 2003, when President Hu Jintao dismissed the minister of health
and the mayor of beijing for mishandling SarS, the central government began to
mobilise the localities and mass media to address the crisis (Zhang and Fleming
2005). Due to the need to protect china's image as a regional and global power,
its leadership sensed the urgency of containing the infectious disease (Saich 2006).
any failure to do so would undermine the Prc's global image as a responsible
international actor controlling the transnational transmission of infectious disease.
china's belated openness was partly attributable to pressure from the wHo. Its
representatives in beijing pushed the central government to be more transparent
about the occurrence of SarS cases. Still, when wHo delegates were sent to
inspect beijing's 301 Military Hospital, the Hong Kong media revealed that SarS
patients had already been transferred to other places outside the purview of wHo
investigators. the wHo issued travel advisories that recommended that travellers
consider postponing their trips to Hong Kong and the Prc between april and May
2003, an action that was arguably too mild and yet diplomatic.
china's response to SarS was comparable to other asian states affected by
avian influenza. In February 2004, Indonesia admitted that an outbreak of avian
influenza had occurred August 2003 (Revill 2005, 183). thai authorities were
alleged to have covered up an outbreak of avian influenza for the sake of protecting
the country's exports of poultry (see Greger 2006). while Singapore responded
