Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
more effective the governmental response is, the stronger the regime's legitimacy will
be. However, the external ramifications of the domestic response to infectious disease
are outside the scope of this chapter. Indeed, the weaker the governmental response
to the outbreak of infectious disease, the stronger the likelihood of the spread of the
disease to the outside world. This narrow definition of health governance contributes
to a deeper understanding of the political impact of infectious disease on a particular
regime, even if many scholars define health governance as embracing various
external and internal actors, such as the wHo, civil society, and nongovernmental
organisations (nGos).
Governmental Capacity to Respond to Infectious Disease in Asia
the improvement of health governance is the most important challenge in
globalisation. both human security and national security are at stake because of the
speed at which infectious diseases can be transmitted to a large segment of the local
population. SarS is a typical example. Since the origin of the disease was related to
the consumption of civet cats among chinese residents in Guangdong province, the
PRC's health governance can be measured in terms of its ability to prevent its citizens
from eating wild animals from live-animal markets that have been thriving since
the country's economic boom (Paterson 2004; bonn 2003). other barometers that
measure china's health governance include the flow of communications between the
central government and provincial as well as local governments during an outbreak
of infectious disease, the ability of the central government to mobilise in order to
contain the spread of the deadly virus, and the compliance of provincial and local
authorities in tackling the health crisis.
three indicators are critical to enhancing governmental capacity: preparedness,
openness, and responsiveness. In the case of SarS, governments in asia and canada
shows that the case fatality ratio in canada was 17 percent, the same as that of Hong
Kong, where SarS left an indelible imprint and a painful memory. other asian
states witnessing a relatively high ratio of case fatality were Singapore, thailand,
taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and vietnam. the Prc had the largest number
of people infected with SarS. although its case fatality ratio was claimed to be
7 percent, 349 people died of the mysterious disease (wHo 2004b).canada's
performance during the SarS outbreak might not be an accurate indicator of how
it would react to another new epidemic. Some argue that SarS did not appear to
necessitate any stringent or draconian measures from the canadian government. this
argument is flawed. True, the SARS crisis was unprecedented and microbiologists
could not quickly predict whether it would be temporary or not. but given the case
fatality ratio in canada, ottawa and the provincial governments underestimated the
speed at which SarS could affect the canadian population. canada learned a bitter
lesson from its SarS experience. the report published by the national advisory
committee on SarS and Public Health (2003a) recommended a better mechanism
