Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
sustainability. Thus, the viable governance options outlined in Figure 8.3 must care-
fully consider the following (Tyler 2004): (i) water pricing, (ii) whether water is
a social or an economic resource, (iii) and virtual water. Lack of access to safe
and clean water is symptomatic of poverty (Mathur 2004), which must be abolished
through economic development. Energy subsidies for irrigation (Shah et al. 2003),
such as in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, and Gujarat states of India, are the cause of the
groundwater overdraft, depleted aquifers, salinized soils, and bankrupt electricity
utility companies (40%-60%). Indeed, the low efficiency of water use in agriculture
in India can be improved by rational pricing of water (Singh 2007; Kondepati 2011).
While farmers are sensitive to an increase in irrigation price change, water sustain-
ability and security cannot be achieved unless the administered prices are increased
to the level that would prevail in the free market.
A significant reliance on participation by local communities is an option that
needs careful appraisal (Figure 8.1). Excessive use can be avoided if water is regarded
as a precious resource (Alauddin and Quiggan 2008), without falling into the trap
of “the tragedy of commons” (Hardin 1968). Adopting concepts of socioecology
(Mukherji and Shah 2005) may be relevant to sustainable groundwater development
(Limaye 2004). Therefore, an effective community-based approach would call for
the following (Alauddin and Quiggin 2008; Gadgil and Rao 1995): (i) greater local
control on water (and soil/land), (ii) enhanced capacity for value addition, and
(iii) specific financial rewards. Financial rewards can be implemented through pay-
ments for ecosystem services. Some of the policy options to resolve the conflicts
include the following:
1.
Water privatization
: It involves transferring of water control and/or water
management services to private companies (Sampath et al. 2003). Water
privatization [at different levels such as (i) service contracts; (ii) design,
build, operate, own, and transfer; and (iii) divestiture] is recommended by
the national water policy of India (Article 13). Rational price recovery from
the consumer is the only option to address inefficiency and excessive use.
2.
Public participation
: A grassroots or a bottom-up approach to conflict
resolution involves public participation in water management. Building on
traditional knowledge and indigenous water structures and management
systems may be cost-effective (Tankha and Fuller 2010). The proposed
river-linking scheme, with an estimated budget of $120 billion aimed to
transfer India's fierce monsoons into a friend (Bagla 2006; Misra et al.
2007), is also based on the privatization model.
3.
Scarcity value
: Ghosh and Bandyopadhyay (2009) hypothesized a scarcity
value-based explanation of transboundary water disputes in the Cauvery
River basin. It is the value that could have been generated if the limit on
water availability could be relaxed by one unit. It measures the degree of
deprivation and creates the basis for disputes. Ghosh and Bandyopadhyay
observed that water disputes between the states of Karnataka and Tamil
Nadu are not based on the physical scarcity of water but are a temporal
coincidence of demand based on scarcity value, and imply that enhanced
supply would not necessarily resolve the conflict.
