The Long and the Short of It - The Changing Arctic Environment: The Arctic Messenger - page 334

Radioactivity
Anticipation:
The nuclear powers from 1945 until the early 1960s probably did not anticipate the scale
and global scope of environmental and human health risks related to the atmospheric test-
ing of nuclear weapons. If they did, they likely considered such effects as costs justified
bytheglobalpoliticsoftheColdWar.Atthesametime,Iexpecttheybelievedthatcareful
design and operation would prevent accidents at civilian reactor and waste storage sites.
Perception:
The global risks resulting from atmospheric testing had certainly been perceived by the
late 1950s, when high body burdens of radionuclides were discovered in Sami consumers
of reindeer meat. It was perhaps the first time the Arctic Messenger told the world of the
unusual sensitivity of the Arctic environment and also warned of global environmental
and human health implications attributable to human activity in distant locations.
Reaction:
By 1963, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and a large number of
nonnuclear states had signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This banned the testing of nuc-
lear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater or in outer space but allowed underground
tests. France and China never signed the treaty and continued atmospheric testing un-
til 1974 and 1980, respectively. More recently, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (that
came into force in 1996) also included the prohibition of underground tests. These actions
brought an end to the injection of radionuclides into the atmosphere from weapons test-
ing.
Is there a lesson we can learn from this that may be useful to remember when we look at the
other issues? I think there is if we frame the question differently. Why were countries able to
react quite quickly and cooperatively once the global risk from radioactive fallout had been