Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
The erosion of institutions and the practice of fudge have also contributed to an absence
of strategy across many areas. George Tanham, who was a respected South Asia and se-
curity specialist at America's Rand Corporation policy think tank, controversially wrote in
1992 that 'Indian elites show little evidence of having thought coherently and systematic-
but what he went on to say is as true today as it was then: 'Few writings offer coherent,
articulate beliefs or a clear set of operating principles for Indian strategy. Rather, one finds
a complex mix of writings, commentaries and speeches, as well as certain actions that cast
some light on Indian strategy. The lacunae and ambiguities seem compatible with a culture
that encompasses and accommodates readily to complexity and contradiction. They also
seem more confusing to Westerners than to Indians who accept the complexities and con-
tradictions as part of life.'
He was referring mainly to foreign policy and security strategy, but the point is valid
far more widely. On foreign affairs, few people - or foreign countries - understand where
India stands, and there is no think tank of a top international standard. On economic and in-
dustrial policy, there is little overall strategy or consensus covering, for example, economic
liberalization or foreign investment. 'One of the biggest weaknesses affecting India's eco-
nomic liberalization is the way that industrial and allied policies are made,' I wrote on my
ation and retail stem far more from the pressures of vested interests and lobbies than from
reasoned analysis and debate.' The reforms of 1991 were introduced because of a financial
crisis and, though they have not been reversed, widening them is highly controversial and
they are not underpinned as part of an overall strategy of public policy.
There has also been no clear view on the role of dynasty in politics, and in particular
on the role of the Nehru-Gandhi family at the top of the Congress party. Sonia Gandhi, as
president of the Congress and head of the ruling UPA coalition after the 2004 general elec-
tion, pulled strings, jugaad-style, from behind the walls of her Delhi house at 10 Janpath
without any clear institutional delineation of her powers in relation to the prime minister.
The official line was that Gandhi was in charge of party politics while Manmohan Singh
was in charge of the government, but in practice Gandhi dictated government policy when
it suited her. Would such a vague, undemarcated relationship have been possible at the top
of a democracy with a strong institutional base?
The leadership vacuum from 2004 was in marked contrast to the previous government
when Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP prime minister from 1998, presided with the stature
of a statesman and with strong central authority. A brilliant orator but slow speaker who
was not given to discursive interviews, Vajpayee did not lead in an outgoing, inspirational
sense, but he ruled with authority, mainly through Brajesh Mishra, his national security ad-
viser and principal secretary. Vajpayee was 73 when he became prime minister and relied
