India and the US - Implosion: India's Tryst with Reality - page 327

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India and the US
Sometimes Partners, Not Allies
India's relations with the US were transformed in 2008 with a deal on the civilian use of
nuclear energy that gave it a new level of acceptability in Washington and international re-
spectability, plus access to nuclear energy and freedom to trade internationally in sensitive
technologies. In terms of the history of independent India, this stood alongside the econom-
ic liberalization reforms that began in 1991, which were the biggest positive event since
the British left in 1947. 1 Its effect has not been as instantly dramatic as those of 1947, nor
yet as progressive as 1991, but it helped to change India's potential place in international
affairs and laid the foundations for the world's most powerful and largest democracies to
become allies one day, though progress is slow.
There have been ups and downs since 2008 as both sides have begun to learn about each
other's priorities and limitations, but there are strong bilateral links. Nearly three million
people of Indian origin live in America, forming the second largest Asian community there
and playing a significant role in politics and business, and there are almost 100,000 Indian
students studying in the country. 2 There is a $100bn target for annual two-way trade and
there is substantial direct investment in businesses and projects - $50bn from the US into
India and over $11bn from India into the US. 3
From the Indian side, the nuclear deal was achieved primarily because of three men who
saw the historic potential of ending a half-century stand-off. The first two were Jaswant
Singh, who was India's external affairs minister from 1998 to 2002 in the then NDA gov-
ernment, and Brajesh Mishra, a retired diplomat who was a central figure in that govern-
ment, pulling the strings of power for Prime Minister Vajpayee. With Vajpayee and Singh,
Mishra led a transformation of foreign (and security) policy, not just with the US but also
Israel and Pakistan. 4 The third person was Manmohan Singh. Though largely seen from
2009 as an ineffectual prime minister, he had had the vision to revive the nuclear deal when
it appeared to be collapsing in 2008 5 and to drive it through a parliamentary confidence
vote (amid allegations of bribery) on the floor of the Lok Sabha 6 . In terms of personal initi-
ative, this far exceeded his role as finance minister in 1991. All three men had to overcome
extreme scepticism in India because of a deep distrust of America, especially in the self-