Pakistan and the Neighbourhood - Implosion: India's Tryst with Reality - page 315

The basic dispute between the two nuclear powers has existed since independence.
Pakistan claims Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim area centred on the 5,2200-ft high Srin-
agar valley, as its territory. In response, India claims (but has never expected to get or
seriously pursued) Pakistan's Azad Kashmir, immediately to the west of the LoC, and its
Northern Areas that stretch up to the border with China at the 15,400-ft high Khunjerab
Pass in the Karakoram mountains.
Mainstream politicians on both sides recognize that the only logical settlement is to
abandon their claims and accept the Line of Control as the formal border, but long-standing
passions make it difficult to put this into practice. On the Pakistan side, it would be firmly
resisted by the army, backed by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which pursues an ag-
gressive policy on India in order to justify its existence and political authority, and to ex-
tend Pakistan's regional reach. It would probably be accepted in India, provided there was a
strong government in power, though it could be difficult to gain political acceptance. There
is also rivalry for influence in Afghanistan and there is a China factor - Beijing enjoys
India being destabilized by uncertain borders with Pakistan.
Kashmir
For the first 35 years or so after independence, the Pakistan-India confrontation focused
on the claims for Kashmir territory. Cross-border terrorism then developed in the 1980s
when Pakistan trained and helped infiltrators to cross the border into India's state of Punjab
during Sikh extremists' unsuccessful Khalistan (independence) movement, and then into
Kashmir across the LoC from around 1989-90 to foment an insurgency against India. Later
there were major terror attacks in other parts of India.
The internal Kashmir insurgency stemmed from demands for some form of autonomy
from Delhi, with extremists wanting full independence, or to become part of Pakistan, and
a majority wanting a special semi-autonomous status. India would never agree to independ-
ence or a Pakistan takeover, and there is no prospect in the foreseeable future of the semi-
autonomous demands being met in any sort of settlement between Delhi and the Kashmiris.
That is partly because of an unwillingness in the Indian capital to grapple with the issue,
and partly because no settlement is possible without the involvement of Pakistan.
Consequently, Kashmir regularly has periods of serious unrest, as happened in 2010
when protests were driven primarily by discontented youth. 2 The army was called in to
quell clashes between security forces and stone-throwing and mostly young demonstrat-
ors. Kashmir seemed doomed to many more years of uncertainty, with periods of violen-
ce alternating with relative calm. 3 Prospects for the state's youth were bleak, with serious
risks of them becoming increasingly militant. After two decades of trouble, generations had