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make' categories that would enable the Indian private sector to become more involved,
transferring technology from abroad that would then be used and developed in India with
the help of government finance. Uncharacteristically, Antony implemented this in July
2012 when, after long delays, the Indian Army invited the private sector to compete against
DPSUs for the design and development of a $2bn (Rs10,000 crore) internet-based project
called the tactical battlefield communication system. The government would cover 80 per
cent of development costs and the remaining 20 per cent would come from the private and
public sector companies. 53 The US and other countries use the same sort of 'make' pro-
cedure, but the Indian defence establishment had lobbied strenuously against it, especially
on this project. Bharat Electronics, a DPSU, wanted exclusive rights so that it could prove
itself on advanced internet technology, though it would have almost certainly merely im-
ported a massive amount of technology and components without India gaining any real
knowhow. The companies involved were L&T, Tata Power SED and HCL, competing
against Bharat Electronics. The battle was far from over, however. Progress on awarding
the contract has been slow, as have similar plans for a 'futuristic infantry combat vehicle'
(FICV).
Antony began to acknowledge that the private sector should have a greater role from
February 2013, when he came under pressure over the latest of a string of corruption cases
on foreign defence contracts that eventually upset a planned $750m order with Finmeccan-
ica of Italy for 12 British-made Augusta-Westland 'VVIP' helicopters. This case, which
began with corruption investigations in Italy, drew Indian media attention to the 70 per cent
import figure and led Antony to promise changes. 54
The outlines of what might happen were announced in April 2013, 55 when the defence
ministry admitted at last that 'the only way forward for the country is rapid indigenization
of defence products, with both the public and the private sectors playing pivotal roles
in this endeavour'. Preference would be given 'for indigenous procurement' with 'global
cases being a choice of last resort'. It was not clear how much change this would generate,
mainly because Indian-made aircraft, ships, tanks and guns would not be available unless
foreign defence manufacturers and technology were attracted into the country with relaxed
equity investment regulations. That was followed by a new defence purchasing procedure
(DPP-2013) that aimed to boost private sector involvement by sharpening the definition
of 'indigenous content' so that foreign components were not used by the DPSUs in sup-
posedly Indian-made equipment. 56 There were also proposals for the defence establishment
to share advance information on armed forces' requirement with industry, and to identify
procedural entry points where companies could be involved in purchasing decisions.
It seemed, therefore, that reforms were on the way that would begin to correct some of
the failings that have seriously impeded India's defence preparedness. But, once again, the
momentum was swiftly dissipated and little more was done by Antony. The new defence
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