Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Cohen and Dasgupta acknowledge that not everyone agreed with their interpretation
when it first appeared (and became a surprising best-seller in India). They note in the pa-
perback edition - optimistically from their viewpoint - that 'many Indians do not see their
country as being bound by strategic restraint', and instead 'want India to behave like a
great power in the mold of the United States, Britain, and China - assertive powers willing
and able to defend their interests with military forces when necessary'. Arguably, however,
they are seriously underestimating the strength of policy opinion that does not want India
to play a big international role beyond its regional interests, irrespective of how much that
might annoy policy hawks both in Delhi and in Washington DC (including experts at the
Brookings Institution).
One needs therefore to look to other catalysts for change on arms purchasing. One
is technological because software and electronics are playing a growing role in defence
equipment and are making it easy for foreign suppliers and countries, including seemingly
friendly ones such as the US, to undermine the effectiveness of guns, helicopters or aircraft
that they supply by withholding sensitive and sophisticated refinements. 'This is no longer
just a question of strategic autonomy; today it is also a military-technical issue, in an era
when the capabilities of defence equipment depend more on software than on hardware and
when it is increasingly easy to compromise weaponry sold to another country through the
introduction of malware and kill switches,' says Shukla.
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Public Failings
Output per employee in the DPSUs and ordnance factories is less than half the average
level in India's general manufacturing industry in the public as well as the private sector,
gested that the defence figure should be double its present level at around Rs 30 lakh. Des-
pite the navy's relative successes, Indian warships are being built way over cost and time
estimates - frigates of the Godavari class took 72 months to build and Delhi class destroy-
ers 114 months, while more recent Shivalik class frigates are taking 112 months compared
with a 60-month target, says Manoj Joshi.
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A basic problem with both the defence research and production corporations is that they
focus on developing and manufacturing a specific gun, aircraft or ship, instead of build-
ing the sort of general engineering capabilities that private sector companies such as L&T,
Godrej and Tata Power have done with finely tuned metals and engineering systems, ac-
cording to Naresh Chandra, a veteran civil servant who headed a government taskforce on
national security in 2012. 'Don't beat your brains out over developing a gun or a tank, but