The role oF local power relations in household vulnerability to Climate Change in humla, nepal - Climate Change Adaptation and Development: Transforming Paradigms and Practices - page 211

1991; Watts and Bohle 1993; Blaikie et al. 1994; Ribot 1995; Adger and Kelly
1999; Yaro, 2004; O'Brien et al. 2008; Pelling 2008; Eriksen and Lind 2009).
Dependency relations are a critical part of the dynamic that reinforce
differences in vulnerability between households. Borrowing food, money and
seeds from the better-off in the village or villages nearby is the most common
response to acute food shortage. The system of creditor and lender constitutes
an essential informal network where the poorer and food-insecure households
owe money (or food) to a few relatively well-off households. Food-insecure
households often report having relatively large debts compared to food-secure
households - some up to NR 200,000 (about USD 2400) - which is a lot of
money for poor households that typically report annual incomes of less than
NR 20,000). In addition, men from poor households engage more in daily
labour to repay the debt, thus spending less time on agricultural production, and
adding this task to the women's burden. For example, one very poor family in
Syaandaa owed more than NR 100,000 (approximately USD 1200) to a better-
off family due to loans taken over several years to buy food and clothes. The
latter family took half of the lands of the poor family as a mortgage to recover the
money. This left the poor family with barely enough land to produce food for
about four months of the year. Moreover, whatever money the husband earned
through daily labour went directly to the creditors, restricting any chances to
invest in education for the children and/or small trade. Next time their harvest
failed they would have no option but to increase their debt to the local creditors
even more.
Among various social networks, the lagi system, 7 a feudal arrangement similar
to a patron-client relationship (or a form of bonded labour), is still practised
in Humla, with Dalits having to work a certain number of days each year for
'their' lagi Thakuri families in exchange for food. These bonds are inherited,
and although Dalits may have more freedom compared to a few years ago, this
system is still much in use. About 60 per cent of the Dalits interviewed report
that they turn to their 'Thakuri lagi ' for food during crisis. In return for this
support, the Dalits are expected to work for the lagi's household on a regular
basis. However, most Dalits consider the help they could receive from the
lagi system unreliable, since the Thakuri lagis might be unwilling or unable to
provide them with sufficient food in times of crisis. The dependency inherent
in this system is shown by the fact that if a Dalit has not already done a favour
for his/her Thakuri lagi in the past, he/she has, in practice, no legitimate claim
for assistance in time of crisis. For example, in the course of our fieldwork we
observed how a Dalit man asked for food at a Thakuri house, but was turned
down because he had not collected firewood for them. There were also a few
cases where Thakuri and Dalits mutually helped each other, exemplifying the
diversity of social relations. For example, one Dalit reported that he had been
helped by his Thakuri lagi to sort out a dispute with the Maoists during the war.
The power and social relations represented by social networks - whether the
deeply entrenched caste system in Lower Humla or the more informal creditor-