Cognitive Aspects: How People Perceive, Memorize, Think and Talk About Landmarks - Landmarks: GIScience for Intelligent Services - page 69

configurational knowledge in the planning process (actually, it does not require
further configurational knowledge at all). In order to supplement mental spatial
representations by anchoring configurational knowledge, global orientation must
be based on phenomena that can be experienced by the human senses. Among
these perceivable phenomena are the position of the sun or of the stars, of winds
or currents, and potentially the Earth's magnetic field [ 126 ] . However, while a sense
for the magnetic field has been proven for some animals [ 57 , 96 , 230 ] , evidence for
a human sense remains inconclusive [ 72 ] .
But even semi-stable azimuthal references are considered by humans in spatial
problem solving. Geographic objects that are either sufficiently far away or suffi-
ciently large that the azimuth does not change significantly during a spatial task can
serve as an azimuthal reference also, although with higher error margin. According
to our prior classification these objects belong to the global landmarks. They can be
the peak of a mountain visible on the horizon (sufficiently far away), the direction
to a neighboring city as learned by traveling (sufficiently far away), or a coastline
(sufficiently large).
Datum location and orientation are arbitrary choices, and between the different
choices a linear transformation by a shift and rotation provides compatibility. This
arbitrariness of choosing a datum is a fascinating property. For reasons of cognitive
efficiency it is actually chosen according to a task at hand. The mind does not
have to retrieve the whole configurational knowledge from long-term memory into
working memory for a task at hand, but can be selective and reduce the cognitive
load significantly to the landmarks and vectors that are relevant. We may call this
ability to focus. As advantageous as focusing is, there is a price to pay. As Montello
has put it: “There is always some aspect of location or heading that a person does not
know precisely. In other words, everyone is potentially disoriented to some degree
at all times” ([ 149 ] , p. 264).

3.3.2.3 Hierarchies

Assumptions of a 'map-like' mental spatial representation were expressed since
To lm an [ 216 ] and maintained for some time (e.g., [ 119 , 159 ] ). A more carefully
phrased explanation was presented by Downs and Stea [ 44 ] :
Cognitive mapping is a process composed of a series of psychological transformations
by which an individual acquires, codes, stores, recalls, and decodes information about
the relative locations and attributes of phenomena in his everyday spatial environment.
A cognitive map is the product of this process at any point in time.

They did no longer make a direct claim that this product is a single integrated
picture. Later Tversky made a point that the term map can only have metaphorical
meaning for an actually more complex mental spatial representation, one that has
also some properties of a collage structured by some spatial models of relations
between objects [ 221 ] . For good reasons we therefore stick in this topic with
the neutral term mental spatial representation . There is no single, homogeneous
pictorial 'mental map', or synonymously, 'cognitive map'.