Power and Strategies of Rule - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 81

30 On the notion of institutional power, see Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Polit-
ics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 39-75.
31 Judith Goldstein and Joanne Gowa, “U.S. National Power and the Post-war Trading Regime,” World Trade
Review 1 (2002), 154-70.
32 On the ways in which the democratic character of states facilitates institutional commitments, see Lisa Martin,
Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2000); and Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press, 2005).
33 Press-Barnathan, Organizing the World , 61.
34 Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2005), 50.
35 Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34, no. 3
(Winter 2009), 158-96.
36 Cha, “Powerplay,” International Security , 158.
37 Stewart Patrick, The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War
(Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 270-71.
38 Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An agenda for research,” International Journal 45, no. 4 (1990), 742.
See also Daniel Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regime (Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press, 2007), 45.
39 The literature on hegemonic stability argues that a single powerful state can have incentives to promote and
support an open world economy. If the leading state is sufficiently large, it will identify its interests with the organ-
ization of the international system, and it will be willing to provide the public goods associated with organizing and
maintaining an open world economy even if it alone bears the costs. The seminal statement of this thesis is Charles
Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-30 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). These ideas are
developed further in Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975);
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Stephen D.
Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976), 317-47. Dur-
ing the 1980s, refinements, extensions, and critiques were put forward. For a summary of these debates, see David
Lake, “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Poten-
tial?” International Studies Quarterly 37 (1993), 459-89. For a recent restatement of the theory, emphasizing the
self-interest-based logic of hegemonic leadership, see Carla Norrof, America's Global Advantage: U.S. Hegemony
and International Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
40 One argument in the literature on hegemonic stability is that the hegemonic state—by virtue of its size and
power—is able to act on its long-term interests rather than struggle over short-term distributional gains. In Robert
Keohane's formulation, the theory holds that “hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are
most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well
obeyed.” Such states have the capacity to maintain regimes that they favor through the use of coercion or posit-
ive sanctions. The hegemonic state gains the ability to shape and dominate the international order, while providing
a flow of benefits to smaller states that is sufficient to persuade them to acquiesce. See Keohane, “The Theory of
Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977,” in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M.
Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 132.
41 This logic is sketched in Ikenberry, After Victory , chap. 3.
42 See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organ-
ization 44, no. 4 (June 1990), 283-315; Lisa Martin, “The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism,” in Ruggie, ed.,
Multilateralism Matters , 91-124; and Lisa Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organiza-
tion 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), 765-92.