Power and Strategies of Rule - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 79

stitutional structures had the effect of making state power more authoritative, lasting, and plenary within society. On
the ways in which state builders in early modern Europe supported the promulgation of legal and political institu-
tions to facilitate the establishment of stable rule, capitalist markets, extraction of revenue, and the deployment of
government authority, see Jean Baechler, Origins of Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975 [1971]); Ernest Gellner,
Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas,
The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973); and John
A. Hall, Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1985). For an exploration of why “powerful political actors” variously resist and embrace the rule of law, see Steph-
en Holmes, “Lineages of the Rule of Law,” in Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds., Democracy and the
Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). In this sense, domestic and international realms are
not, as structural realist theory suggests, fundamentally different. Institutions matter in the international realm just
as power matters in the domestic realm.
5 See Judith L. Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds., Legalization and
World Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). For rationalist explanations for variation in the form of institu-
tions, see Lisa Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992),
765-92; and James Morrow, “The Forms of International Cooperation,” International Organization 48, no. 30 (Sum-
mer 1994), 387-423.
6 As such, rule through relationships and rule through rules offer distinct and alternative logics of governance.
The ideal-typical order built on rule through rules is one where states are sovereign and equal under the law. The
ideal-typical order built on rule through relationships is one where states are differentially arrayed around the dom-
inant state—a hub-and-spoke system in which the bilateral relationships are defined by the gradient of power asym-
metry and the specific bargain and exchanges that result.
7 James Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science
Review 66 (1972), 1142-58. For other discussions of clientelism and patronage politics, see S. N. Eisenstadt and
Rene Lemarchand, eds., Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981) .
8 Gianfranco Poggi, “Clientelism,” Political Studies 31 (1983), 663.
9 See Christopher P. Carney, “International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework,” Studies in
Comparative International Development 24, no. 2 (Summer 1989), 42-55.
10 For a discussion of dependency and bargaining models of relations between weak states and strong states, see
Bruce E. Moon, “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State,” International Studies Quarterly 27 (1983), 315-40.
11 The term “comprador” is sometimes used to denote this indirect form of dominance. It originally referred to
a member of the Chinese merchant class who aided Western traders beginning in the late eighteenth century. These
local agents were hired by contract and were responsible for a Chinese staff that facilitated trade and exchange. The
term now is used in reference to individuals who aid Western economic trade and investment—and exploitation—in
the developing world.
12 These forms of hierarchical rule are captured in a rich literature on neocolonialism and dependency relations
in the developing world. See, e.g., Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in
Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and Jorge Larrain, Theories of Development: Cap-
italism, Colonialism, and Dependency (London: Polity, 1991).
13 Osita G. Afoaku, “U.S. foreign policy and authoritarian regimes: Change and continuity in international clien-
telism,” Journal of Third World Studies 17, no. 2 (Fall 2000), 13-40.
14 On American client states, see David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski, U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients,
Enemies, and Empire (New York: Routledge, 2009); and Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World
Interventions and the Makings of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
15 On special relationships, see John Drumbell and Axel Schafer, eds., America's Special Relationships: Allies
and Clients (New York: Routledge, 2009). On America's special ties with Great Britain, see Duncan Andrew Camp-