Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
national order that a leading state will want. The question is, how can it get them and what
price must it pay along the way?
An important variable in this framework is also the most difficult to specify. It has to do
with legitimacy. A leading state has an incentive to create an international order that is legit-
imate. Such an order is one where other states cooperate within it willingly. At some basic
level, the leaders of weaker and secondary states accept the logic and normative underpin-
nings of the order. If an order is constituted as such, the leading state will not be required to
use its coercive power to enforce rule. The order itself will take on a more cooperative and
efficient character. Diffuse reciprocity is more likely under these circumstances. The leading
state can pursue its interests without worrying about challenger states that seek to overturn
the order. But questions remain. What specific features of the order give it legitimacy? If the
leading state wants to establish a legitimate order, how does it go about it?
The implication of my argument is that the more rule-based the order is, the more legitim-
ate it is likely to be. As the character of a hierarchical order moves from imperial to liberal
hegemonic, somewhere along this continuum, the order will take on features that will lead
participants to see it as legitimate. But how much rule-based character is enough to give the
order legitimacy? And what are the costs to the leading state—in terms of cooperation and ef-
ficiency of rule—if the overall system declines in legitimacy? The answers to these questions
will, in turn, inform judgments by leading states about the value of legitimacy and their will-
ingness to bind themselves to a rule-based international order. These questions have come
into focus with the rise of American unipolarity after the Cold War.
1 On constitutional order in international relations, see G. John Ikenberry, “Constitutional Politics in International
Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (1998), 147-77; and Ikenberry, After Victory , chap.
2. 2 This is dominance based on the perceived legitimacy of the rules and institutions that structure the exercise
of power. In effect, a hegemonic order organized around the rule of law is, as Max Weber described legal-rational
authority, “domination by virtue of 'legality,' by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and function-
al 'competence' based on rationally created rules .” Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright
Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 79.
3 See G. John Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (September
2003), 533-50. This definition of rule-based relations draws on discussions of the organizational logic of multilater-
alism, including John G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism
Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3-47; and
essays in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
4 This is the paradox of power: a powerful state can increase its influence and ability to shape outcomes in the in-
ternational system by voluntarily restraining and institutionalizing its power, at least to some extent. Power and rules
are not opposites but work together in complex and reinforcing ways. This paradox is a major theme in the study of
power within societies. As many scholars have noted, the rise of modern Western states—and the strengthening of
their position relative to social groups and classes—involved gradual steps by absolutist rulers to delimit the powers
of the state and embed its authority within legal and political institutions. Institutionalizing state power within con-
 
 
 
 
Search WWH ::




Custom Search