Power and Strategies of Rule - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 75

sultation. In these instances, it is not—strictly speaking—giving up or reducing its policy
autonomy. But it is agreeing to operate in an institutional environment in which other states
have opportunities to influence what the hegemon does. The United States has made this a
feature of its approach to hegemonic rule. Through NATO and other formal and informal ar-
rangements, the United States offers voice opportunities to other states in exchange for their
cooperation and acquiescence. 52 In these circumstances, the dominant state opens its doors to
outsiders—offering the opportunity for consultation and influence by weaker and secondary
states—while not agreeing to formal limits on its independence of decision making.
Fifth, the dominant state can promote rule-based relations through unilateral steps that do
not require it to make binding commitments to others. Specifically, it can also use the size of
its economy—and the dependence of other states on it—as a tool to influence the policies of
other states. Its domestic rules and regulations become the world's rules and regulations. Its
internal regulatory standards are externalized. States with sufficient market size can influence
global regulatory rules through the use of market power and coercion. 53 As Nico Krisch ar-
gues in regard to the United States, “US rules often exceed their formal confines and begin to
function as global rules.” This is not simply because of American pressure but also because
of “the superior expertise of US agencies, the availability of model norms in US domestic
law, and the market dominance of US corporations, especially in the early phases of emer-
ging fields.” 54
In a study of economic regulatory cooperation, Daniel Drezner argues that as levels of
economic interdependence grow, so do the benefits of policy coordination. But for a state to
adjust its domestic regulatory arrangements to converge with cooperative agreements gener-
ates domestic economic and political costs. The greater the divergence from the coordination
agreement, the higher the costs. In the struggle over who adjusts—that is, who alters its do-
mestic regulatory standards to converge in an international agreement—great powers tend to
win. Drezner notes that because their larger internal markets give them bargaining power,
major states are “more likely to achieve regulatory coordination at their preferred level of
standards.” 55 This logic applies more generally to a dominant state's incentives in support-
ing global rules and institutions. It will seek to extend its internal rules and institutions to the
outside system, exporting the costs of adjustment onto others. All states have an interest in
arriving at an agreement that coordinates policy—particularly in areas of business and trade
regulation—but the leading state can use its power advantages to get other states to adopt its
rules and regulations. 56
Beyond this, the United States has found a variety of ways to use its domestic laws to pro-
mote international rules and norms. One is the certification mechanism, in which the Amer-
ican government defines substantive rules and monitors compliance in countries around the
world—in areas such as arms control, environmental protection, human rights, narcotics,
and terrorism. Developmental aid or military assistance from Washington hinges on wheth-