Power and Strategies of Rule - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 62

minish the role of the arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of power. The other is a system
in which power asymmetries are translated into an array of hierarchically organized bilateral
relations and political dependencies. 16
A leading state can pursue both these sorts of strategies, and indeed the postwar interna-
tional order bears the marks of both these logics of rule. The United States pursued both rule-
based and client-based strategies in the 1940s. Toward Western Europe, the United States
pursued primarily a strategy of rule through rules—working closely with postwar European
states in building multilateral economic rules and institutions and agreeing ultimately to mul-
tilateral security cooperation. In East Asia, the United States pursued a series of bilateral se-
curity pacts, creating a hub-and-spoke system of security cooperation. 17 Outside of these two
regions, the United States established a wide variety of patron-client relationships—in many
instances, old-style imperial domination. 18
Although these strategies offer alternative logics of rule, they also can work together with-
in an international order. Client-based relations between a dominant state and weaker sec-
ondary states can provide ways for the dominant state to signal restraint and commitment and
channel payments and rewards for cooperation within the wider rule-based international or-
der. Overall, it is the mix of these types of rule that give the international order its imperial
or liberal character. We can look more closely at the logic of rule by rules and the limits and
trade-offs that a dominant state faces in pursuing strategies of rule.
States and International Rules and Institutions
Why do states—to the extent they do—organize international relations around multilateral
rules and institutions? The answer is that institutional agreements help states create a predict-
able and cost-effective environment in which to pursue their interests. In effect, international
rules and institutions are potentially useful to states as tools of political control. Their basic
value to states is that they affect the levels of state autonomy and political certainty. Rules
and institutions alter the environment in which states operate.
There are two ways in which institutions act as tools of political control. One is that they
help solve collective-action problems by reducing the commitment uncertainties and trans-
action costs that stand in the way of efficient and mutually beneficial political exchange. 19
In these instances, states are using rules and institutions to reduce the uncertainty about the
reliability and intentions of other states, thus overcoming fears of cheating or bad faith. Insti-
tutions provide a bundle of functions that make it easier for states to work together for mutual
advantage. The institutions facilitate the flow of reliable information that reduces obstacles to
transactions that advance the interests of the participating states. The institutions help states
assess the reputations of other states by providing benchmarks and standards of behavior