Power and Strategies of Rule - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 59

As we discuss later in this chapter, building order around rule-based relations can be an
attractive strategy of rule for a dominant state. If the rules can be established widely—spread
across many states and regions and covering an array of policy realms—it can be an efficient
mechanism for ensuring a stable and congenial environment for the leading state to pursue its
interests. Control is not directly maintained through the exercise of power; it is embedded in
the rules and institutions themselves. 4
Table 3-1
Leading States and Strategies of Rule
These rule-based relationships can take different forms—variations defined in terms of
the degree to which the rules are mutually agreed upon and applied and the degree to which
they place binding constraints on the states involved. At one extreme, a dominant state can
impose rules on weaker states but remain unconstrained itself. This is, in effect, the imper-
ial use of rules. Alternatively, the rules could be mutually agreed upon and apply to both
the leading state and other states but provide differential rights and obligations based on
power position. The dominant state or the great powers might operate under a different set
of rules—conveying rights and authority—that other states do not possess. At the other ex-
treme, the rules could be mutually agreed upon and apply equally to all states regardless of
their power or position within the system.
Regardless of whether rules are differentially applied or not, the rules themselves can be
more or less binding. In their loosest form, rule-based relations can simply entail general con-
sultations and informal adjustment among states. The diplomatic practices of the Concert of
Europe were of this sort—where the great powers observed a set of unwritten rules and norms
about the balance of power on the continent. In the current era, the World Trade Organiza-
tion and other multilateral economic institutions entail more formal, treaty-based agreements
that specify certain commitments and obligations. But the binding character of these mul-
tilateral agreements is still qualified: escape clauses, weighted voting, opt-out agreements,
and veto rights are all part of the major post-1945 multilateral agreements. The most bind-
ing rule-based agreements are ones where states actually cede sovereignty in specific areas
to supranational authorities. The European Union is the most important manifestation of this
sovereignty-transferring, legally binding rule-based form of rule. 5