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and incentives that states like the United States face in building and operating within rule-
based international order.
This chapter unfolds in four steps. First, I explore the ways in which dominant states shape
their international environment; that is, their strategies of rule. Powerful states have a variety
of tools with which to build and manage international order. The two most salient mechan-
isms for establishing hegemonic order are “rule through rules” and “rule through relation-
ships.” The first entails the provisioning of multilateral agreements that specify the rules and
institutions through which states are expected to operate. These rules and institutions can be
more or less formal, encompassing, and binding. The second entails the forging of bilateral
relationships between the lead state and weaker and secondary states. These client-state re-
lationships or “special relationships” involve bargains and agreements in which the leading
state offers benefits or services—such as security protection and market access—in exchange
for political support and cooperation within the wider international system.
Second, I make a set of claims about why and how states use international rules and in-
stitutions—and in doing so, I offer a political-control explanation for institutions. Rules and
institutions are mechanisms that allow states to assert some control over their environment
by making more predictable the policy actions of other states. In committing to operate with-
in a framework of rules, a state is agreeing to circumscribe its policy autonomy or freedom
of action—in various ways and degrees—so as to induce other states to do the same. A state
bargains away some of its policy autonomy to get other states to operate in more predictable
and desirable ways, all of it made credible through institutionalized agreements. The shift-
ing incentives, choices, and circumstances surrounding this institutional bargain help explain
variations in state commitments to rules and institutions.
Third, I argue that this same logic applies to powerful states, such as the United States.
Indeed, a dominant—or hegemonic—state has a complex array of incentives to use rules and
institutions to shape its environment, including to reduce its enforcement costs, foster legit-
imacy, and institutionalize a favorable international order for the long term. A leading state
should want to establish a favorable set of rules and institutions that shape and constrain the
policies of other states. To do so is to create a more stable and predictable environment in
which it can pursue its interests. And it reduces the necessity of exercising power to enforce
the terms of order. If these rules and institutions are mutually agreeable, the order itself be-
comes more legitimate, reducing the costs of enforcing order. Moreover, if the rules and in-
stitutions are deeply embedded in wider systems of politics and economics, the order itself is
made more durable and can last even into the future when the power of the hegemonic state
declines. So rules and institutions are not the enemy of powerful states—but there are costs
and trade-offs associated with rule through rules, and the incentives for pursuing rule-based
order will vary accordingly.
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