Power and the Varieties of Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 40

Constitutionalism and Consent
International order can also be organized around agreed-upon rules and institutions. This is
order based on consent. Here, states and societal groups of various sorts respond to deep
impulses and incentives to mutually build structures of exchange and cooperation. Liberal
democracies in particular are drawn to this sort of order, finding their security and societal in-
terests advanced through open and rule-based relations. While systems based on balance and
command depend fundamentally on state power—either in balance or by preponderance—for
the establishment and maintenance of stable order, consent-based order relies on shared in-
terests and the rule of law. In its most developed form, international order is constitutional in
character. That is, state power is embedded in a system of rules and institutions that restrain
and circumscribe its exercise. States enter the international order out of enlightened self-in-
terest, engaging in self-restraint and binding themselves to agreed-upon rules and institutions.
In this way, order is based on consent.
This liberal conception of order is attached to a grand narrative about the rise and trans-
formation of the modern international system. It is an account of the “liberal ascendancy.”
In the late eighteenth century, liberal states emerged and began two centuries of experiment
and innovation in order building, championing open and rule-based relations. Triumphs and
setbacks followed. In this liberal ascendancy, the Western democracies became more power-
ful and prosperous. Their numbers and share of world power increased and took a huge jump
with the defeat of fascist and totalitarian challengers in the twentieth century. These liberal
states also made efforts to construct a congenial international order. At postwar moments, led
by Great Britain and the United States, they put forward progressive ideas about the organ-
ization of global relations. With the end of the Cold War, the last rival organizing logic of
world order fell away. 39
There are several specific bodies of theory that contribute ideas to this liberal vision of
order. As Michael Doyle observes, liberal international theory has at least three intellectual
wellsprings. The first is commercial liberalism, which dates back to Adam Smith. The spread
of capitalism and markets creates economic interdependence, joint gains, shared interests,
and incentives for international cooperation. The second is the democratic peace, which
traces to Kant. Republican or democratic polities seek affiliation with each other and mani-
fest pacific relations. The third is liberal institutionalism, which dates to Lockean writings
on rights and the rule of law. International law and institutions are outgrowths of liberal so-
cieties that establish rule-based expectations and obligations between them. 40 Each of these
traditions offers a set of claims about how liberal democracies build and operate within the
international system.
Despite its richness and diversity, liberal conceptions of order share a core set of assump-
tions and expectations. Liberal theories assume that peoples and governments have deep