Power and the Varieties of Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 35

the establishment of legitimate rule. Norms and principles that subsequently evolved within
the Westphalian system—such as self-determination and nondiscrimination—served to fur-
ther reinforce the primacy of states and state authority. 20 To be sure, the resulting norms and
principles of sovereignty and nonintervention have not been inviolable. As Stephen Krasner
argues, state sovereignty norms have been systematically violated by great powers in each of
the eras that followed 1648. They were honored primarily in the breach. 21 Nonetheless, these
norms and principles have served as the organizing logic for Westphalian order and provided
the ideational source of political authority within it. Under the banner of sovereignty and self-
determination, political movements for decolonization and independence were set in motion
in the non-Western developing world. Westphalian norms have been violated and ignored,
but they have, nonetheless, been the most salient and agreed-upon rules and principles of in-
ternational order in the modern era.
The succession of postwar settlements also provided moments for the great powers to de-
velop principles and practices that have shaped and updated the functioning of great-power
relations. 22 Particularly paradigmatic is the Vienna settlement that followed the Napoleonic
Wars. This settlement is widely seen as particularly successful because it was based on great-
power restraint and accommodation. Embodying the restraint principles of the society-of-
states approach to international order, the Vienna settlement integrated the defeated French,
recognized legitimate French national and security interests, and put in place a diplomatic
process for resolving emergent problems on the basis of shared principles and understand-
ings. The resulting Concert of Europe is widely seen as a model of a stable and peaceful
international order. 23 In contrast, the Versailles settlement was famously less successful. Its
punitive character violated the restraint principles that had been so critical to the earlier set-
tlement. Although Woodrow Wilson articulated progressive principles of international order,
the settlement itself was punitive in that it embodied British and French demands for retribu-
tion; imposed heavy reparations, asymmetrical disarmament, and the partial territorial occu-
pation of Germany; and neglected legitimate German national security interests. These pun-
itive features are widely seen as a major reason for its ultimate failure.
The settlement of World War II was more complicated than were previous settlements.
There was no negotiation with the defeated adversaries, Germany and Japan. And the nego-
tiations that did occur at Potsdam and Yalta were conducted by the victors, who essentially
partitioned Europe among themselves. Nonetheless, within the American sphere, the United
States undertook the comprehensive reconstruction of Germany and Japan as liberal demo-
cratic states and their integration into the postwar American-led international order. France
and West Germany tied themselves together through the Coal and Steel Community and to
the other European states in wider European and Atlantic institutions. The great powers of
Europe and Japan were integrated into a rebuilt states system. Along this historical path-
way—through war and settlement, learning and adaptation—it is possible to see an evolution