Crisis of the Old Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 21

7 F. H. Hinsley, “The Rise and Fall of the Modern International System,” Review of International Studies (January
1982), 4.
8 On the politics and ideas of order building after major wars, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions,
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001);
Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Orders, 1648-1989 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1991); Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Condi-
tions of International Stability (London: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Jeff Legro, Rethinking the World:
Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).
9 On the notion of postwar settlements as “constitutional” moments of order building, see Ikenberry, “Constitu-
tional Politics in International Relations, European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (June 1998), 147-77;
and Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). More generally, international legal scholars have explored the constitution-
like features of the post-1945 international system of rights, laws, and institutions. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel
P. Trachtman, eds., Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
10 In his classic study, Hedley Bull distinguished between world order and international order. World order is
composed of all peoples and the totality of relations between them, and international order is composed of the rules
and settled expectations between states. See Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1977). For extensions and refinements of these ideas, see Barry Buzan, From International to
World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004); and Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
11 International order in this sense involved shared and stable expectations among states about how they will in-
teract with each other, or as Janice Mattern suggests, it is a “relationship among specific states that produces and
reinforces shared understandings of expectations and behaviors with respect to each other.” Mattern, Ordering In-
ternational Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force (New York: Routledge, 2005), 30.
12 In the chapters to follow, I will be referring to each of these ways of characterizing and comparing international
orders. On regional and global systems of order, see Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Power: The Struc-
ture of International Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Peter Katzenstein, A World of
Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). On variations in
the institutionalization of international order, see Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1982). On variations in hierarchy, see David Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). On variations in polarity and the distribution of power, see Edward D. Mans-
field, “Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (March
1993), 105-28; and Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers (London: Polity, 2004), chap. 3.
13 See Ikenberry, After Victory , chap. 2.
14 A rich literature exists on the theory and practice of the balance of power. For surveys, see Richard Little,
The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007); Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., The Balance of Power in World
History (New York: Palgrave, 2007); Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International
Relations since Machiavelli (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), chap. 2; and Daniel H. Nexon, “The
Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Politics 61, no. 2 (April 2009), 330-59.
15 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Prin-
ceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), chap. 1.
16 In depicting the liberal ascendancy, Daniel Deudney writes: “For most of history, republics were confined to
small city-states where they were insecure and vulnerable to conquest and internal usurpation, but over the last two
centuries they have expanded to continental size through federal union and emerged victorious from the violent total